RESOLUTION

on

REINFORCING NATO’S DETERRENCE IN THE EAST *

The Assembly,

1. **Acknowledging** that NATO’s territories and populations face significant conventional and hybrid threats, particularly in the East;

2. **Aware** that NATO-Russia relations are at the lowest point since the end of the Cold War, **cognizant** of Russia’s large-scale military aggression against Georgia in 2008, continuous illegal occupation and steps towards factual annexation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia, and **mindful** that Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea prompted quid pro quo sanctions, rancorous rhetoric, and high levels of mistrust;

3. **Alarmed** by Russia’s increasingly escalatory and reckless pattern of behaviour in the form of cyber attacks, the use of force against its neighbours, the illegal use of chemical nerve agents for attempted murder on Allied territory, as well as its insidious undermining of democratic institutions and principles through its use of election interference and disinformation campaigns;

4. **Cognizant** that Russia’s doctrinal shift from 2010 to 2014 has reaffirmed NATO as its *de facto* competitor and that it views NATO activities in Central and Eastern Europe as direct threats to Russian national interests;

5. **Concerned** by Russia’s deployment of modern anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems along NATO’s eastern flank, which could impede the Alliance’s freedom of movement;

6. **Stressing** the importance of the Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and the Baltic States and the Tailored Forward Presence in the Black Sea Region as key defence and deterrence measures to secure NATO’s eastern flank;

7. **Welcoming** Georgia’s engagement in strategic discussion and mutual awareness on Black Sea security and Georgia’s contribution to NATO’s efforts to enhance Black Sea security;

8. **Recognising** that NATO’s eastward enlargement has resulted in the need for strategic enhancements, specifically concerning outdated infrastructure and bureaucratic regulations, which could delay the quick movement of troops and supplies;

9. **Noting** that many of the significant concerns in NATO about infrastructure and regulations impeding military mobility can be found in Suwalki Corridor, the location of which between

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Kaliningrad and Belarus makes it a potential choke point between the Baltic States and the rest of the Alliance’s eastern members;

10. **Applauding** the EU Transportation Coordinating Committee’s EUR 1.9 billion investment in strategic infrastructure in Eastern Europe and other major improvements in necessary infrastructure developments in NATO’s eastern flank, and **recognising** that the impetus must now be on NATO and the EU working together to deliver the shared goal of being able to move NATO forces (both EU- and non-EU Member States) across Europe as quickly as possible;

11. **Recognising** the Trident Juncture 2018 exercise in Norway offered a crucial opportunity to test the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF);

12. **Commending** the installation of the new NATO Joint Force Command for the Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia, and the US Navy's reactivation of the Second Fleet as necessary for the protection of the North Atlantic;

13. **Supporting** the NATO Readiness Initiative (30-30-30-30 Plan) as essential to meeting the demands of NATO’s new defence and deterrence posture;

14. **Praising** the Enablement Plan for SACEUR's Area of Responsibility as a means of improving NATO forces' response time in a potential crisis;

15. **Upholding** NATO’s dual track approach towards Russia, based on a combination of deterrence, defence and dialogue;

16. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

   a. to continue to ensure the sustainability and readiness of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States and Poland, and the Black Sea region, VJTF, and enhanced NATO Response Force;

   b. to address existing barriers to military mobility at the legal and infrastructure levels in Europe through enhanced NATO-EU cooperation;

   c. to invest in the improvement of strategic infrastructure as a necessary element of countering hybrid warfare, such as improved roads, bridges, communication infrastructure, ports and airports and to reinforce the security of energy projects;

   d. to develop an early warning system to detect a possible incursion into the strategically vital Suwalki Corridor, develop infrastructure for quick deployment and sustainment of troops and the necessary manpower to defend the essential territorial link with the Baltic States;

   e. to deepen dialogue and engage Georgia in the framework of NATO’s Tailored Forward Presence (tFP);

   f. to further the implementation of NATO’s Readiness Initiative which is essential to meeting the demands of NATO’s new defence and deterrence posture and its reinforcement;

   g. to demonstrate continued commitment to the Enablement Plan for SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility, which is dedicated to improving legislation and procedures, enhancing command and control, and increasing transport capacity;

   h. to address force deficiencies, develop faster deployment times, and make available the resources necessary to sustain deployed forces;
i. to ensure the Alliance has the necessary means to reinforce Allies in an A2/AD environment, potentially through the acquisition of advanced fighter jets, jamming systems, and longer-range precision missile systems;

j. to commit to resourcing Alliance contingency plans, including force allocation needs of Graduated Response Plans that address Eastern threats.