



## NATO Parliamentary Assembly

# SUMMARY

of the meeting of the Defence and Security Committee

*Plenary Hall, Senate, The Parliament (Senate and Chamber of Deputies) of Romania  
Bucharest, Romania*

Saturday 7 and Sunday 8 October 2017

**ATTENDANCE LIST**

<b>Committee Chairperson</b>	Raymond KNOPS (Netherlands)
<b>General Rapporteur</b>	Joseph A. DAY (Canada)
<b>Special Rapporteur</b>	Wolfgang HELLMICH (Germany)
<b>President of the NATO PA</b>	Paolo ALLI (Italy)
<b>Secretary General of the NATO PA</b>	David HOBBS
<b>Member delegations</b>	
Albania	Mimi KODHELI Perparim SPAHIU
Belgium	Xhemal QEFALIA Peter BUYSROGGE Karolien GROSEMANS Sébastien PIRLOT Karl VANLOUWE Veli YÜKSEL
Bulgaria	Hristo GADZHEV Simeon SIMEONOV
Canada	Leona ALLESLEV Pierre-Hugues BOISVENU Michael COOPER Pierre PAUL-HUS
Croatia	Miro KOVAC
Czech Republic	Patrik KUNCAR Martin SEDLAR
Denmark	Peter Juel JENSEN
Estonia	Hannes HANSO Marko MIHKELSON
France	Sonia KRIMI Jean-Charles LARSONNEUR Joachim SON-FORGET
Germany	Rainer ARNOLD Lorenz CAFFIER Karin EVERS-MEYER Wolfgang HELLMICH Anita SCHÄFER
Greece	Andreas LOVERDOS Ioannis PLAKIOTAKIS
Hungary	Matyas FIRTL
Italy	Lorenzo BATTISTA Luciano URAS Vito VATTUONE
Latvia	Artis RASMANIS
Lithuania	Juozas OLEKAS
Montenegro	Obrad Miso STANISIC
Netherlands	Bastiaan van APELDOORN Franklin van KAPPEN Raymond de ROON Herman SCHAPER

Norway	Sverre MYRLI
Poland	Waldemar ANDZEL Przemyslaw CZARNECKI Jan DOBRZYNSKI Stanislaw PIETA
Portugal	Joao REBELO
Romania	Nicu FALCOI Mihai Valentin POPA
Slovakia	Anton HRNKO
Slovenia	Matjaz NEMEC
Spain	Eugenio Jesus GONZALVEZ Gabino PUCHE Luis RODRIGUEZ-COMENDADOR
Turkey	Ziya PIR Sirin UNAL
United Kingdom	Lord CAMPBELL OF PITTENWEEM Kevan JONES Madeleine MOON Alec SHELBROOKE Bob STEWART
United States	Paul COOK Thomas MARINO Michael R. TURNER

**Associate delegations**

Armenia	Koryun NAHAPETYAN
Austria	Hubert FUCHS Anton HEINZL
Azerbaijan	Gudrat HASANGULIYEV Malahat IBRAHIMGIZI
Finland	Eero HEINALUOMA Mikko SAVOLA
Serbia	Vladimir DJUKANOVIC
Sweden	Björn von SYDOW Hans WALLMARK
Switzerland	Isidor BAUMANN Josef DITTLI Werner SALZMANN
Ukraine	Yurii BEREZA Iryna FRIZ Oksana YURYNETS

**Regional Partner and Mediterranean Associate Member Delegations**

Algeria	Nordine BENKORTBI
Jordan	Hussein MAJALI
Morocco	Mohammed AZRI

**Parliamentary Observers**

Australia	Ross HART
Egypt	Eid HAIKL Khaled MEGAHED
Kazakhstan	Yersultan BEKTURGANOV
Republic of Korea	Sang Don LEE Jong-Kul LEE

**Parliamentary Guests**

Afghanistan

Mohammad Alam EZEDYAR

Khalid A. PASHTOON

**Speakers**

**Mihai-Viorel FIFOR**

Minister of National Defence of Romania

**General Nicolae-Ionel CIUCĂ**

Chief of General Staff of Romania

**Dr Thomas KARAKO**

Senior Fellow, International Security Program,  
Director, Missile Defence Project, Center for  
Strategic and International Studies

**Elizabeth PEARSON**

Associate Fellow, RUSI and PhD Candidate at  
King's College London

**Emily WINTERBOTHAM**

Senior Research Fellow, RUSI

**International Secretariat**

Ethan CORBIN, Director

Anna PICHLER, Coordinator

Carmyn CHAPMAN, Research Assistant

**I. Opening remarks by Raymond KNOPS (Netherlands), Chairperson**

1. The Chairman of the Defence and Security Committee (DSC), **Raymond Knops** (NL), welcomed all Committee members and observers to Bucharest and thanked the Romanian delegation for hosting the 2017 Annual Session. Mr Knops then reviewed the procedure for submitting amendments to the Committee's draft resolutions supporting both NATO-EU Cooperation and NATO Operations in Afghanistan – amendments were to be given to the Committee secretary before 10:30 the same morning. He also noted, on Sunday 9 October at the end of the meeting, the Committee would elect new Committee and Sub-Committee Officers for vacant mandates, including; DSCFC Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson, and a representative to the Ukraine-NATO Inter-Parliamentary Council. All other current officers were eligible for re-election. Interested candidates were told to present their candidacy to Defence Committee Director, Ethan Corbin. The Chairman then welcomed the Committee's speakers, whose biographies, he noted, along with all speeches and presentations were available on the new NATO PA website. He then proceeded with the Committee business.

**II. Adoption of the draft Agenda [160 DSC 17 E]**

2. **The draft Agenda [160 DSC 17 E] was adopted without amendments.**

**III. Adoption of the Summary of the Meeting of the Defence and Security Committee in Tbilisi, Georgia on Saturday 27 May 2017 [139 DSC 17 E]**

3. **The summary of the meeting of the Defence and Security Committee [139 DSC 17 E] was adopted.**

**IV. Procedure for amendments to the draft Resolution on *Closer NATO-EU Cooperation* [217 DSC 17 E] and *Supporting the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces* [216 DSC 17 E].**

4. The Chairperson presented the procedure for amendments to the draft resolutions on *Closer NATO-EU Cooperation* [217 DSC 17 E] and *Supporting the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces* [216 DSC 17 E]. He noted the submission (to the Committee secretary) deadline for amendments was 10:30am Sunday and for resolutions presented to the Plenary the deadline was 10:00am Monday (Plenary and Procedures office).

**V. Panel Discussion on *Security Developments in Romania and the Black Sea Region* followed by a discussion**

5. The Chairman introduced the two host country speakers, who would speak on a panel about security developments in Romania and the Black Sea region; **Mihai-Viorel Fifor**, Minister of National Defence of Romania, delivered the first presentation. Minister Fifor welcomed the delegation to Romania, acknowledging the importance of the meeting. He continued by noting the leading role NATO and other multilateral institutions played in Romanian security policy and in the broader efforts to protect Euro-Atlantic community values.

6. Minister Fifor told the audience the security environment in the Black Sea region is at its post-Cold War nadir, particularly due to Russia's growing militarisation of the region, notably in Crimea. As such, he characterised the situation as both "fluid and unpredictable." To counter this development, he continued, Romania is increasing its investment in situational awareness capabilities both at home and in the broader region.

7. Minister Fifor then reviewed key components of Romania's national security and defence policy, noting the Defence Ministry's intention to develop national capabilities in conjunction with the country's strengthened commitments to international organisations. He told the Committee Romania will prioritise NATO's post-2014 adaptation efforts, thereby adopting a 360-degree approach to security. Romania has increased its NATO contributions by hosting components of the Tailored Forward Presence (tFP) on NATO's eastern flank and contributing troops to the US-led battle group as a part of the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). Romania's geographic location in south-eastern Europe between the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region, he continued, can be a strategic asset. Romania will continue to advocate for a unitary approach for the Allied eFP on the eastern flank, and thanked Allies for their contributions to these units.

8. Minister Fifor then broadened the discussion to other evolving security threats, including terrorism, WMD proliferation, as well as cyber and energy security risks. To tackle some of these challenges, he underlined Romania's support for smart defence initiatives, major capability development projects such as Allied BMD, Allied ground surveillance system, Allied airborne early warning capabilities and strategic air lift capabilities. He concluded by encouraging the Alliance to continue communicating its message of unity and solidarity, and to reaffirm its commitment to the preservation of international law.

9. Mr Knops thanked the Minister for his presentation. He then introduced the second panel speaker: **General Nicolae-Ionel Ciucă**, Chief of General Staff of Romania. General Ciucă welcomed the distinguished members of the Assembly, noting that he was honoured to contribute to the discussion about security and stability in the Black Sea region. He explained that over the last two decades, the Black Sea region has transformed from an area of cooperation to one of strategic competition where economic, political and military interests collide. Recent developments indicate a degradation of the security situation, which is further exacerbated by the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, he explained. He recommended all NATO member states maintain a high level of awareness of the evolving challenges, as stability in this region is critical for the security of NATO's entire eastern flank.

10. General Ciucă also overviewed Romania's contributions to increasing robustness and cohesiveness of NATO's presence in the east, reflecting the Warsaw Summit decisions for a more robust deterrence presence in Eastern Europe. Since 2016, a NATO multinational division and one of NATO's National Force Integration Units (NFIU) have been headquartered in Romania, and the Romanian NFIU has participated in Alliance readiness and interoperability exercises. In his remarks, the General explained Romania has stepped up its process of military modernisation and is working continually on readiness and interoperability.

11. General Ciucă also emphasised Romania's commitment to NATO defence spending goals. Starting in 2017, continuing for the next decade, Romania will dedicate 2% of GDP to defence budget. In 2017, Romania also spent over the 20 percent NATO guideline on new equipment. He also noted Romania's participation in the US-led battle group as part of the EFP, and drew attention to the positive developments with the combined joint-enhanced training and air patrolling missions carried out by the UK, Italy and Portugal in the Black Sea region. He drew parallels between the TFP and EFP on the eastern flank, and affirmed strengthening this posture on the entire eastern flank, along with defence planning and building new capabilities as being critical to contribute to the security of the entire Alliance.

12. General Ciucă concluded by highlighting Romania's contributions to NATO's security and stability efforts in the global coalition to counter Daesh in Syria and Iraq as well as its ongoing mission in Afghanistan.

13. **Juozas Olekas** (LT) asked what more needs to be done to stabilise the situation in the Black Sea region: more economic sanctions, a larger Alliance military presence, more support for Ukraine. Minister Fifor responded by noting the importance of Ukraine's enhanced political

presence in NATO and of the strategic partnership with the United States. He also said the Alliance could work more broadly to strengthen the breadth and depth of its eastern flank presence, noting the importance of political and military signals of solidarity with Ukraine.

14. **Madeline Moon** (UK) noted Romania's likely considerable challenges in dealing with cyber and other hybrid destabilisation tactics at home and in the region. She asked if Romania has experienced the same kind of disinformation and election interference from Russia, for example, as have the United States, the UK, and Germany, and, if so, what were its tactics for dealing with the problem. Minister Fifor responded by saying he believes every country in the Alliance is subject to Russia's attempts at domestic interference and that Romania is working to develop specific capabilities to counteract such threats. He said Romania would continue to be very attentive to this issue.

15. **Michael R. Turner** (US) underlined the solid bi-lateral ties between the United States and Romania; a fact highlighted by the stationing of the first Aegis Ashore BMD site in Deveselu, which also represents the convergence of US, Alliance, and Romanian defence interests. He commended Romania's commitment to reach NATO's 2% defence spending benchmark. He asked what more will be necessary to ensure NATO's ballistic missile defence is effective. Mr Fifor responded and also reflected on the success of the project in Deveselu. He said part of Romania's overall readiness programme included the purchase of seven SM Patriot systems, along with another 36 F-16 aircraft. Such efforts, he said, would go a long way to modernise Romania's defence capabilities. **Lord Campbell of Pittenweem** (UK) also noted Romania's contributions to NATO and willingness to deploy forces. In addition to Mr Turner's question on air defence systems, he asked what naval assets Romania has, and what plans there are to replace or upgrade them. Minister Fifor agreed that maritime capabilities are a key component of deterrence on NATO's eastern flank, and noted Romania's plans to upgrade and renew their naval forces, including the production of four corvettes through an industrial cooperation programme. He said there is a need for more political will to ensure these programmes are carried out.

16. **Paul Cook** (US) added to the conversation on readiness by reflecting on his visit in the region in August where he attended NATO's live-fire exercises in Georgia. He highlighted the professionalism and capacity of the Romanian armed forces. However, he wanted to note the logistical challenges apparent in the region (a topic later discussed by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in the Plenary Session); he explained, in order to maintain the speed necessary for regional crisis management and force deployments, there is a need to deal with bureaucracy at the borders and to ameliorate logistical challenges. Minister Fifor agreed, citing speed as central to an effective military response. However, he emphasised the ability to improve infrastructure depends on continued economic growth in Romania and the implementation of the ambitious infrastructure deal put in place by the Romanian government. He advocated for Romania to be part of the EU's Schengen space.

17. **Joao Rebelo** (PT) highlighted the excellent relationship between Portugal and Romania and thanked the Minister for including threats emanating from the South in his discussion of NATO's security landscape. He then asked if Russian planes and ships had violated Romania's air space and territorial waters. He also asked for clarification on the size of Romanian military and defence spending. The Minister thanked Portugal for its support and affirmed Russia also violates the airspace in Romania, citing this as a reason for the air policing missions currently conducted in Romania and the broader region. He reported 2% of Romania's GDP in 2017 would be approximately \$3.8 billion for defence spending, noting 38% of this amount – \$1.4 billion – is allocated for procurement. He also reported the size of the Romanian military is 90,000 personnel (75,000 military personnel and 15,000 civilians), which he explained are all professional military. **Yuri Bereza** (UA) also drew attention to Russia's regional aggression, which he sees as emblematic of the broader strategic competition between Russia and the West today. He asked the Minister how he understands the development of the situation in Transnistria, noting the large presence of Russian troops on the Romanian border. The Minister noted clear concern about

Russia's regional presence, particularly since the annexation of Crimea. He said in this context, Romania aims to contribute to a firm posture and to demonstrate readiness in the Alliance's eastern territories. He said they also plan to adhere to Secretary General Stoltenberg's policy of remaining firm, but avoiding any increasing tension in the situation.

18. **Mimi Kodheli** (AL) asked the Minister about his comments on the growing terrorist threat in the Balkans. She said she disagreed about the magnitude of the problem, instead noting she understood the region's terrorism challenge to be diminishing when compared to a couple years ago. She asked if more information sharing is the key to solving this problem. The Minister said he believed she misunderstood him – he wanted to emphasise he was speaking about terrorism as just one of the threats, not that it is increasing in the Balkans, but that the threats from the South should be considered as a whole.

19. Chairman Knops thanked Minister Fifor and General Ciucă for their informative and excellent presentations, and more broadly, Romania for its contributions to NATO.

#### **VI. Consideration of the draft Special Report *Afghanistan* [164 DSC 17 E] by Wolfgang HELLMICH (Germany), Special Rapporteur**

20. The meeting reconvened with the consideration of the draft special report on Afghanistan presented by **Wolfgang Hellmich** (DE). Mr Hellmich reiterated the importance of the Committee's regular review of developments in the security environment, and reform, political, civil, and economic elements in Afghanistan as many Allies and international partners have invested significantly in Afghanistan, and continue to do so today. He highlighted Romania's participation in the mission in Afghanistan – they are currently the 6<sup>th</sup> largest contributor with 587 personnel deployed – and noted the recent announcement by the United States to increasing their force presence with an additional 4,000 forces for the purpose of training and addressing combat readiness of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the Afghan Special Forces.

21. Mr Hellmich explained US counterterrorism operations continue to weaken Daesh's presence in the country. The threat Daesh poses in Afghanistan, however, is still real, as shown by the several successful large-scale operations the group has executed this year in Kabul. Hellmich also noted increased violence and civilian casualties throughout the country, making 2016-17 the most violent year since 2009.

22. Mr Hellmich also noted the increased violence has also drawn the government in Kabul's attention. In conjunction with NATO forces' commitment to assisting the ANDSF's rehabilitation, President Ghani has pledged to increase the ANDSFs' capabilities over the next four years and announced a wide-ranging anti-corruption campaign. He also noted the US government and NATO leadership's efforts to address the issue of ghost soldiers and their work to cut waste and eliminate fraud and abuse in the Afghan military. Mr Hellmich noted the effort to root out corruption in the military is part of broader efforts to address public sector corruption. He also reported insurgent violence in the country has had a significant impact on the economy; foreign direct investment in the private sector remains weak, and this may result in regional investment outweighing western investment.

23. Mr Hellmich concluded by stressing the fight against terrorism as well as the security and stability missions in Afghanistan are both critical to preventing Afghanistan from ever becoming again a safe haven for terrorist groups and are "part-and-parcel" with burden-sharing efforts across the Alliance. However, he said the road ahead includes many challenges, including those deriving from regional political dynamics and the repatriation of millions of Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran – there are nine million people in desperate need of assistance. Moving forward, Mr Hellmich said it was top priority to ensure the ANDSF have the equipment and leadership



necessary to counter increasing violence in the country and break the stalemate with the Taliban; both NATO Resolute Support and the financial support for the mission are of vital importance. As such, he demanded, on behalf of the Alliance, notable “returns-on-investment” – the creation of strong institutions and increased self-reliance – in Afghanistan.

24. Mr Hellmich then told the Committee that a representative from the Afghan parliament had requested to make a statement to the Committee. **Mohammad Alam Ezedyar** (AF) then took the floor. Mr Ezedyar conveyed his country’s gratitude to NATO member states and their partners as they continue to stand with Afghanistan in the fight against terrorism. Terrorism, he continued, not only directly threatens security, but it also undermines growth and progress; it is a key challenge to global peace and security. Mr Ezedyar said there is no alternative to defeating terrorist groups, but emphasised the importance of sustainable development in all aspects of life—culture, politics, society, the economy—as a part of creating permanent sustainability and prevailing peace in Afghanistan. He recommended increased coordination with other countries in the region, especially Turkey, Russia, central Asian countries, and India as, he reflected, without cooperation and coordination with all relevant actors, there cannot be victory in Afghanistan.

25. The Chairman also emphasised NATO’s strong commitment to the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. **Sirin UNAL** (TR) voiced concern about the terminology “warlord” used to describe Mr Dostrum in paragraph 43 and the ethnic classification in paragraph 71 of “Pashtun areas.” He also asked that the conclusion be more explicit in that ownership of the peace processes and of stability and security in Afghanistan truly belongs to the Afghan people and government. Mr Hellmich replied terminology in the report reflects the most recent information available to the Committee regarding domestic affairs and he reaffirmed the terminology as written. He did say it would be possible to change the wording in the conclusion. Madeleine Moon then suggested future iterations of the report focus more on corruption in the police, administrative, and social sectors, and on regional geopolitics and Afghanistan’s diplomatic relations with its neighbours. **Lorenzo Battista** (IT), highlighted the importance of capacity and state-building in Afghanistan, as mentioned by Mr Ezedyar, and asked for more details about the long-term strategy in Afghanistan, inquiring specifically as to the troop levels necessary for success in the NATO-led mission. Mr Hellmich welcomed Ms Moon’s suggestions and agreed more attention should be paid to the regional situation, suggesting NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan should be complemented by a coordinated peace strategy with Russia, India, and China. He reaffirmed peace could not be achieved with only a military strategy, more work in the fields of diplomacy and development is necessary.

26. **Khalid Pashtoon** (AF) shared some positive developments on security and stability in Afghanistan, reporting 2017 was the most productive year in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and that more people are optimistic about the future of the country. He suggested this was due to increased investment by the international community and the successes of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. Providing additional appreciation for the accuracy of the report, **Jean Charro** (FR) voiced his agreement with Madeleine Moon the Committee should look more closely at the regional players in the domestic conflict, specifically Pakistan, India, and China. **The draft report [164 DSC 17 E] was adopted.**

**VII. Panel Discussion on *Ballistic Missile Defence and NATO*: Presentation by Thomas KARAKO, Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Director, Missile Defence Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, on *The Future of Integrated Air and Missile Defence in Europe*, followed by a discussion and the Consideration of the draft report *Ballistic Missile Defence and NATO* [161 DSC 17 E] by Senator Joseph A. Day (Canada)**

27. The Chairman welcomed the Committee back from lunch for a discussion on ballistic missile defence (BMD), including presentations by subject matter expert from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, **Dr Thomas Karako**, and the Committee Rapporteur, **Senator Joseph A. Day** (CA). Dr Karako opened the discussion noting Romania's considerable contributions to NATO's air and ballistic missile defence architecture. He outlined three main points he was hoping to convey in the presentation and to advocate for the future parliamentary consideration: First, retain the NATO commitment to BMD and stay the course on Aegis Ashore deployments; second, expand the focus from BMD to integrated air and missile defence (IAMD); and, third, declare clearly NATO's Russia problem includes a Russian missile problem.

28. Dr Karako then overviewed the strategic environment, asserting the international system is witnessing a missile "renaissance", characterised by both an increasing supply and demand for highly precise, high-velocity missile systems Dr Karako noted the Committee's draft report reflects this reality, in addition to highlighting NATO's commitment to a balanced deterrence and defence framework – including both missile defence and nuclear deterrent assets – as set out in the Warsaw Declaration. Dr Karako continued by stressing the threat to NATO posed by North Korea, reflected by Pyongyang's significant uptick in missile, ICBM, and nuclear testing this year. As a consequence, he continued, it is likely the United States will rebalance toward homeland missile defence. Such a move, however, will likely not detract from the US regional missile defence efforts, particularly the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).

29. Dr Karako then reflected on the Iranian missile threat. He told the delegation that as Iran's missile development was not constrained by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more active means, such as an effective, flexible, BMD architecture will continue to be necessary to limit Iran's missile programme. Dr Karako also said NATO must acknowledge both Russia's aggressive behaviour on the Alliance's eastern front and the growing Russian anti-access and area denial (A2AD) zones as destabilising to NATO's deterrence and defence posture. He recommended NATO continue to put forth clear messaging regarding the purpose of the Alliance's BMD architecture and continue to counter Russian disinformation.

30. Dr Karako concluded by emphasising the importance of deepening NATO efforts to integrate better air and missile defence, in order to be prepared to defeat a wide variety of complex integrated missile threats. He emphasised the importance of synergy and interoperability among NATO's IAMD assets; Allies should be highly attentive to new national air and ballistic missile defence purchases are interoperable and can be integrated into the NATO architecture. He also suggested the creation of a new NATO IAMD Center of Excellence modelled on the IAMD centres in Abu Dhabi and Hawaii. He explained these steps would contribute to more robust NATO IAMD capabilities, and thus, would strengthen deterrence, improve stability, and serve several of the Alliance's strategic political, economic, and military goals.

31. Next, Senator Day presented the draft general report *Ballistic Missile Defence and NATO*. He thanked the Committee for its commitment to the subject and noted the Committee's report is meant to provide broad-based context to help parliamentarians understand the progress and purpose of NATO's current and evolving BMD architecture. Reflecting on the September 2017 DSC visit to Seoul, he highlighted the emerging and evolving North Korea ballistic missile and nuclear threats and cautioned against underestimating the motives or capabilities of the Kim Jong-un regime. He said recent tests indicate the country has developed increasingly capable,

indigenous systems with greater range and re-entry capability that threaten the US mainland directly, as well as Europe. He continued by asserting Iran has made considerable advancements in missile technology and maintains an expanding ballistic missile arsenal; Iran's missiles continue as a tool of regime power and threaten Europe. Senator Day noted that, for these reasons, NATO continues to prioritise BMD as a core collective defence capability and that the subject demands increased attention from all political and military leaders throughout the Alliance as well as from its international partners.

32. He then reviewed the current state of NATO BMD, which has been at initial operating capacity since July 2016. Senator Day stressed the importance of continued Allied commitment and contributions to the architecture, as a way to both increase the system's efficacy and command and control capacity, but also as a means to drive modernisation across member states and strengthen burden-sharing. The future of NATO's BMD programme, modernisation, and system development depends upon further integration of European and US missile defence assets. He reinforced Mr Karako's point that it is a NATO imperative future BMD purchases be compatible with the Alliance's air picture, command and control systems, which he stressed as critical for future crisis management. In an era of limited resources for defence expenditures, he stressed, it is important to make smart purchases.

33. Senator Day also stressed the importance of Alliance leadership response to Russian objections to NATO BMD; particularly that NATO BMD is designed to protect military assets and populations in Europe from any ballistic missile threat, not to undermine Russia's strategic deterrent capabilities. He added that the report clearly states Russia's concerns are ill-founded and their messaging is a tool of political expediency and directed toward a domestic audience. In conclusion, Senator Day affirmed strong Alliance resolve to protect Allies in the face of evolving ballistic missile threats. He concluded by encouraging continued invested in and remaining informed about the ballistic missile defence system.

34. Congressman Turner welcomed the revised report and its clear rebuttal of Russia's unfounded objections to NATO missile defence. He expressed concern at Russia's nuclear weapon programme, which he noted may not have been represented sufficiently in the draft report. He continued by stating Moscow's defence posture is directed against the Alliance's nuclear deterrent. He also supported Senator Day's comments regarding Russian disinformation and emphasised NATO should not allow it to be successful. Senator Day agreed. **Raymond de Roon** (NL) then asked Dr Karako what are the consequences of the Russian S-400 system purchase by Turkey and how he would recommend NATO Allies deal with this problem. Later, Madeleine Moon asked what consequences these purchases – including recent Russian air defence purchases by Saudi Arabia and the UAE – will have for the Alliance in the Middle East. Dr Karako again emphasised the importance of interoperability and integration of member state capabilities and noted it will unfortunately not be possible to integrate the purchase with the NATO air and missile defence picture. He added, this will further inhibit the development of a comprehensive and clear air picture in this region, and that, in such instances, political decision-making is getting in the way of technical information sharing.

35. **Pierre Paul-Hus** (CA) refocused the discussion on North Korea and the threat to NATO's North American Allies. He noted Canada is not fully defended against this evolving threat, and asked what opportunities there were for NATO to help protect Canada as a member state. Mr Day said, as affirmed previously in a report by the Canadian Senate, Canada must stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States in order to ensure effective missile defence of all Allied territory. **Jean-Charles Larssonneur** (FR) highlighted the importance of nuclear deterrence, noting BMD is not a substitute. Dr Karako agreed a mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence are essential for NATO defence and deterrence. He also stressed and repeated missile defence should not be a bargaining chip with respect to arms control. Senator Day agreed it is important NATO continues on the path to achieving a flexible and future-oriented missile defence system.

36. Sirin UNAL again emphasised the importance of procurement choices. He told the delegation that some NATO members prevent necessary technology transfers for air defence system acquisitions, which in turn forces countries like Turkey to look elsewhere for the right kind of capabilities to ensure their security. He added that he believed NATO's current capabilities do not cover all of Turkey. Later in the discussion, Raymond de Roon responded to this comment reminding the Committee of the Netherlands two-year Patriot missile deployment to Turkey, and said it was disappointing to see that in return, Turkey had decided to buy a missile defence system from one of NATO's strategic adversaries. He said if the problem was absence of or ineffective technology transfers, there should be the ability to discuss this and come up with a workable solution. Mr Unal acknowledged, that, yes, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands have supported Turkish air defence, but have withdrawn their systems. Committee Chairman Knops made a final comment citing the complete depletion of the Dutch Patriot systems after two years of 24/7 operation, and the high cost borne by his country to contribute to Turkey's air and missile defence, which, he stressed, was done under the principle of NATO solidarity.

37. **Yuri Belkova** (UA) remarked on the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine and suggested the country could be a key Alliance partner. Mr Karako shared his concern for the challenge Ukraine faces from Russia, and proposed it might be helpful for the NATO partner to meet the threat with capabilities such as short-range air defences, SAMs, and counter UAV capabilities.

38. In conclusion, **Jong-Kul Lee** (KR) noted the Korean delegation's appreciation of NATO's support of the Republic of Korea during the current escalation of tensions on the Korean peninsula surrounding the North Korea missile and nuclear issue, citing a shared concern by Canada, the United States, and Europe of this threat. He encouraged dialogue with North Korea, but asked NATO nations continue to apply diplomatic pressure on North Korea in order to secure a peaceful resolution of the issue. Mr Knopps noted the visit to Seoul played a role in finalising the report. Lorenzo Batista then asked about the possibility a future North Korean missile test could go awry and unintentionally hit a location in Japan and/or be perceived as a real missile strike; he cautioned this could lead to inadvertent escalation. Senator Day agreed the situation is serious and said this is why it would be very dangerous not to prepare to defend ourselves. Reiterating earlier points made by Senator Day and Dr Karako, Mr Batista also encouraged a concerted Alliance-wide effort to move forward with a common missile defence programme.

#### **VIII. Consideration of the draft Report on the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation *NATO-EU Cooperation After Warsaw* [163 DSCTC 17 E] by Attila MESTERHAZY (Hungary), Rapporteur, presented by Lord CAMPBELL OF PITTENWEEM (United Kingdom)**

39. The Committee then considered the draft report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation, titled *NATO-EU Cooperation after Warsaw* by Attila Mesterhazy (HU). The Chairman of the DSCTC, Mr Campbell presented the draft report in place of Mr Mesterhazy. Lord Campbell of Pittenweem began by highlighted the importance of the topic, and noted a new section in the report on joint EU-NATO capability development. He also highlighted adjustments to the conclusion, which now presents a more complete picture of the remaining challenges for deeper cooperation, and the incorporation of the contribution from the European Parliament in the form of an annex.

40. Lord Campbell of Pittenweem remarked on the considerable momentum in NATO-EU cooperation since the Warsaw Declaration was signed in July 2016. He said the broad spectrum of security challenges before Europe serve as clear motivation. For example, the NATO-EU Parallel and Coordinated Exercise 2017 – crisis management simulations, which test the implementation of more than a third of the common proposals – began in early September. Lord Campbell of Pittenweem said, for many reasons, NATO-EU cooperation continues to focus on joint capability development, hybrid threats, cyber security and terrorism, and in this way, has increased joint

exercising, and noted initiatives such as the planned European Centre of Excellence for Hybrid Threats. In addition, the first review of NATO-EU cooperation released in June 2017 reports improvements in information sharing and logistical support, and the first Joint Intelligence Assessment on hybrid threats will soon be available.

41. To reflect these efforts, the revised draft report includes a section exploring the opportunities for cooperation and possibilities for joint capability development. He outlined three areas where this could be done: fostering a common understanding and perception of threats; coordinating the defence industrial base; creating institutional frameworks for joint command and control of forces for exercise and operations. Lord Campbell of Pittenweem explained funding, personnel, and other institutional resources are also supporting joint capability development in new ways, while the Alliance's active capacity-building programme complements the EU's comprehensive preventative, legal, financial, and governance programmes to combat terrorism and security threats. In conclusion, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem said the absence of a real common EU defence budget and varied threat perceptions continue to challenge defence investment and effective cooperation.

42. **Ioannis Plakiotakis** (GR) reaffirmed progress on the joint declaration proposals for strategic cooperation. He challenged the reference to Cyprus as factor preventing NATO-EU cooperation, asking it be deleted, and also stated that the Berlin Plus Framework had never been suspended. Lord Campbell said that these are questions of fact, and that there was an opportunity for putting down amendments to the report through the official process. **Bob Stewart** (UK) then commented, providing his national perspective that it will remain possible in the future for all EU, NATO, and partner nations to contribute to security and defence in Euro-Atlantic and strongly petitioned the Committee to understand the British will always support Europe, even after they leave the EU. Lord Campbell of Pittenweem expressed his difference of opinion advocating the best future of Britain – economic, political, and security – would be realised by remaining in the EU. He also said it is irresponsible to discuss the uncertainty stemming from the NATO-EU arrangement until Article 50 is fully implemented. Finally, **Andreas Loverdos** (GR) underlined the discussion on migration, refugees, terrorism, and criminal networks in the report. He made clear these four groups are not synonymous, but believes criminal networks and terrorists are taking advantage of waves of political refugees and migrants, thus necessitating stronger EU-NATO cooperation. Lord Campbell of Pittenweem expressed his support of this well-drawn paragraph.

43. The Chair closed the discussion and **the draft report [163 DSCTC 17 E] was adopted.**

**IX. Consideration of the draft Report on the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities, *The Space Domain and Allied Defence* [162 DSCFC 17 E] by Madeleine MOON (United Kingdom), Rapporteur**

44. The Chair opened the second day of the Defence and Security Committee meeting, and welcomed the consideration of the draft report titled the *Space Domain and Allied Defence* by Ms. Madeleine Moon. Ms Moon began her presentation by noting the interesting, yet complex nature of the subject and affirmed its importance for the Alliance. She reported continued advances in space technologies are making space exploration and exploitation easier; an increasing number of actors are getting into the space race, while societies and governments have grown increasingly dependent on space assets for life, business, and national security. Modern military forces use increasingly space for essential defence and military purposes. Improvement in space capabilities and technology – including, communication, imagery, navigation, identification and detection systems, as well as tracking and targeting – are all significant force multipliers and essential for the management of effective conventional forces. As a consequence, NATO must ensure no actor can interfere with our space-based assets and infrastructure in order to protect NATO forces' freedom of movement and successful operation on land, at sea, and in the air. Ms Moon said strategic competition and even direct confrontation are risks as China and Russia become increasingly involved in the space domain.

45. The Rapporteur then overviewed the threats to security and defence capabilities related to the space domain, including the development of space weaponry, for example, ASAT capabilities; ASAT capabilities are a threat to both military space-based assets, and commercial satellites alike – space debris resulting from kinetic destruction of a satellite can destroy other satellites. In addition to these threats, she outlined the non-kinetic means actors are employing to disrupt satellite function: cyber hacking, spoofing, and jamming included. NATO must therefore increase the resilience of space assets against interference and develop a comprehensive, whole-of-Alliance approach to streamline these efforts. Ms Moon encouraged governments to consider upgrading the framework for establishing norms in space; currently, the space domain is relatively unregulated and the few existing regimes are outdated and could better reflect the changes in the use of space and advancements of related technology today.

46. Madeleine Moon then focused on the importance of promoting cooperation in space, stating the aim must be to prevent militarisation and any attempt to use offensive weapons directed against asset in or from space; the eventual goal would be a domain characterised by even stronger cooperation, rather than the devolution into one plagued by competition and conflict. She said the report presents a number of steps we can take in supporting an effective space policy. Ms Moon emphasised the role parliamentarians can play in promoting stronger defence and deterrence in this domain.

47. Bob Stewart asked the first question, inquiring if NATO uses space assets for military intelligence purposes, as he views this importance for deterrence and defence. Ms Moon affirmed use of NATO satellite information to provide the most advanced and accurate information possible about our adversaries. Joao Rebelo asked about the data presented in the report, reiterating the problem of space debris emphasised by the Rapporteur and asking who is working to ameliorate this problem. The Rapporteur said all relevant actors are working to develop solutions trying to balance the cost of removal with replacement of space assets. She also believes this is an opportunity for increased cooperation in space. Mr Turner offered final comments on the report. He expressed satisfaction with the change in tone of the report since the initial draft and re-emphasised the magnitude of the challenges posed by the weaponisation of space. He also requested additional consideration be made to balancing references to national space initiatives and that specific mention of world leader's names be eliminated and cautioned not to take out of context US military assessments of space vulnerabilities as detailed in the 2004 US Air Force document. Ms Moon acquiesced to Mr Turner's request to remove President George Bush's name from the report. The Chairman then concluded the discussion, **the draft report [162 DSCFC 17 E] was adopted.**

**X. Presentation by Elizabeth PEARSON, Associate Fellow RUSI and PhD Candidate at King's College London and Emily WINTERBOTHAM, Senior Research Fellow, RUSI, on *Women, Gender and Violent Extremism*, followed by a discussion**

48. **Elizabeth Pearson**, a PhD candidate in War Studies at King's College London, and **Emily Winterbotham**, Senior Research Fellow in the National Security and Resilience programme at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), presented to the Committee on the topic of *Women, Gender and Violent Extremism*. They first overviewed the framework, design, and major findings from the recent research study they conducted looking at the role of gender in countering violent extremism (CVE). In the study they interviewed groups from various communities in five NATO member states – Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The aim of the study was to consider factors affecting or relevant to the fight against Daesh and CVE. They critiqued gender-based generalisations evident in CVE policies that focus too often on the traditional roles of women – as peacemakers and as mother's better able to spot signs of radicalisation – and reported their findings challenge assumptions about how best to include Muslim women in national CVE efforts. They noted international efforts to prevent violent

extremism largely are increasingly recognising the importance of awareness and attention to gender roles in preventing radicalisation.

49. Ms Pearson and Ms Winterbotham also reviewed the unique challenges associated with countering Daesh-inspired radicalisation, and noted the organisation's manipulation of gender to serve its purpose and attract women and girls to the caliphate. Based on the interviews conducted in the study, they learned Daesh offers a state concept (challenging traditional ideas of Statism) where women could live under Sharia law, wear covering garments of their choice, and be free from discrimination and express independence. In this way, they encouraged CVE efforts consider more broadly the concept of women's agency within each national context when considering policies and countering violent extremism. Ms Winterbotham explained they also found radicalisation to Daesh was a form of empowerment for women and in some cases related to their search for identity. Relatedly, they drew attention to the role gender plays in recruitment; they reported variances in female and male radicalisation. For men, radicalisation more frequently took place in public spaces, while women were often recruited through their private networks and online targeting was often a tipping point. They explained it is important to note that social networks are key to the radicalisation process, especially for women.

50. Ms Pearson and Ms Winterbotham also reported gendered perceptions and realities of radicalisation affect how women and men felt they were perceived and treated through public policy. They noted this, in turn, guides or limits how Muslim women and men felt they could contribute to CVE efforts. The presentation also noted gender, family, and religion should be considered when looking at preventing radicalisation. Participants said there was a tendency to absolve women of blame when they themselves were radicalised – they were perceived having been lured, manipulated, or even groomed. However, women felt they bore a larger burden if their children became radicalised. Ms Pearson and Ms Winterbotham cited these feelings were more serious in countries, like the United Kingdom, with strict, criminalised frameworks and policies regarding terrorism. Other traditional causes of radicalisation, including socio-economic, discrimination, and Islamophobia had different effects on men and women. Ms Pearson and Ms Winterbotham emphasised it is important for both men and women to be engaged in preventing radicalisation, as their research demonstrated this process of radicalisation was very quick. They also stressed it is important to consider and understand better how religious conversion factors into the radicalisation process; they reported this can change depending on the family and community dynamic – how prevalent and what role religion previously played in the lives of those being targeted. In conclusion, Ms Pearson and Ms Winterbotham urged policy makers to take more pluralistic, multidimensional, and flexible approach to designing CVE policies and not to view all Muslim women with one lens. They also said more research was necessary to better incorporate into CVE.

51. Lord Campbell of Pittenweem noted the excellent work done at RUSI and asked if changes in the concept of gender will alter the way it should be considered in CVE. He also wanted to know if their study took into account various national policies toward CVE. He commented that it was perplexing women found it empowering to join Daesh when many of them lived in countries where women are increasingly achieving and holding positions of leadership in government, business, and society. Ms Pearson replied that no, they did not assess approaches at the national level, but underlined that national contexts are important to consider when evaluating policies. In terms of agency and opportunity, she reiterated young women expressed the desire to be treated as equals, empowered, and obtain jobs, but at the same time they might be struggling because their faith does not fit with the society they live in. For example, one woman recounted not being able to go to medical school because she wore a headscarf. She said his first inquiry on new fluid concepts of gender did not come up in their discussions. Madeleine Moon asked how people were selected and did they look at different settings (community, university), if there were specific causes of alienation they found to be most common, and for more information about how religion plays into youth radicalisation.

52. **Joachim Son-Forget** (FR) followed up with another question regarding methodology; he asked if they controlled their groups to better account for the debated connection between social psychology and radicalisation and if they compared their results to other studies that accounted for criminality and radicalisation. Ms Pearson said there were a range of different people selected through various community gatekeepers, and that marginalisation and alienation, along with other factors can contribute to people feeling there is no place for them in a secular society. She also explained generational variables, along with gender, affect how religion factors into radicalisation. In response to M. Son-Forget, Ms Pearson said, no they did not have control groups and certainly with Daesh, for example, a different demographic of young man has been attracted to the group because of the relatively open recruiting policy. There has been no kind of filter on the types of people recruited covertly, like with Al-Qaeda. Ms Winterbotham added that there is also an increasing effort to look at the role of prisons play in radicalisation, particularly in relation to converts.

53. **Han ten Broeke** (NL) desired more from the research findings and found the absence of recommendations based on their work disappointing. He acknowledged, as implied by the study, there is no one way to approach CVE or countering radicalisation, and gender, along with many other factors, is important to include in these efforts. However, he said he believed their research did not recognise or articulate appropriately the fact that, in his opinion, Islam is extremely intolerant to gender equality. Ms Pearson recommended he read the report in full, and reiterated, yes, there is no one specific and consistently effective approach to CVE applicable to all settings. Furthermore, she said the purpose of the research was to identify how gender affects CVE, and reiterated many of their findings were often not considered when designing policies, thus making their conclusions important to discuss. Ms Winterbotham added their research began by looking at integration in relation to the terrorist attacks in Europe, but acknowledged it might be time to, again, redesign their approach.

54. The final comments were prescriptive in nature and focused on future research designs. **Hussein Majali** (JO) encouraged further research be more holistic in design, as he heard them allude to multiple important variables unrelated to gender. He also reflected on the CVE programme he led in Jordan, and said he found religion to be one of the most effective tools in fighting extremism. **Veli Yuksel** (BE) asked if they could provide specific data on the average of those converted by foreign terrorist fighters and if they had a suggestion for specific approaches for preventing radicalisation of converts. He proposed European policy and programmatic exchanges on good practices for de-radicalisation. **Nordine Benkortbi** (DZ) provided a national perspective, reporting women in Algeria are actively involved in the fight against terrorism. He firmly stated it is important to say that terrorism has no faith, no religion, no nationality. Ms Pearson made clear the study does not suggest the problem is specific to Muslim women, but the research was selected based on interest, and agreed, there are many factors that could be studied in relation to radicalisation. Ms Winterbotham affirmed women are an important part of peace movements around the world and mobilising against radicalisation and terrorism. She said they are suggesting allowing women to define the role that they can and wish to play in this process. Together they reiterated the importance of further research on converts and religious learning. The Chairman echoed Mr Han ten Broeke's call for policy recommendations citing a strong need for informed CVE policies.

#### **XI. Consideration of amendments and vote on the draft Resolution on *Closer NATO-EU Cooperation* [217 DSC 17 E] by Joseph A. DAY (Canada), General Rapporteur**

55. The Committee commenced with the consideration of the amendments on the draft resolution on *Closer NATO-EU Cooperation* [217 DSC 17 E]. The Chairman also asked for everyone's cooperation in completing all agenda items and closing the meeting before lunch. Senator Day then introduced each amendment, asked the sponsor to defend the proposed changes, and lead the Committee in a vote on each amendment of the resolutions.



56. A number of amendments put forth requesting language and terminology modifications were approved including amendments: #1 (paragraph 1 – Conkar and Unka (TR)); #10 (paragraph 12b (Karagiannidis (GR)); #12 (paragraph 13a – Garriaud-Maylam and Larssonneur (FR)). Amendment #13 (paragraph 4 – Alleslev (CA)), which inserted a new sub-paragraph explaining more explicitly the role of non-EU member states in the transatlantic Alliance, was also adopted. Finally, after some debate, amendment #14 (to insert a new sub-paragraph after paragraph 12d – Manciuilli and Battista (IT)) was adopted to incorporate more fully challenges from the South faced by NATO members.

57. The following amendments were not adopted: #2, #3, #4, #5, #6, #7, #8, and #11. Amendments #2, #4, #5, #6, and #8 all proposed to insert new sub-paragraphs, or to replace existing paragraphs with newly worded text. Most were defeated because the new proposed wording did not significantly change the meaning of the text, and were deemed superfluous. The remaining rejected amendments (#3, #7, and #9) put forth minor language changes. This included two “sanitising” amendments (#3 and #8) both to paragraph 11 proposing to eliminate negative references to Cyprus; there were strong objections to taking out acknowledgement of this problem, and the Rapporteur also supported leaving the text intact. **The draft resolution [217 DSC 17 E] as amended was adopted .**

## **XII. Consideration of amendments and vote on the draft Resolution *Supporting the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces* [216 DSC 17 E] by Joseph A. DAY (Canada), General Rapporteur**

58. The Committee then continued with the draft resolution on *Supporting the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces* [216 DSC 17 E], which flows from the Report presented by Mr Hellmich the previous day. Senator Day led the same review of each amendment and subsequent votes.

59. All of the amendments (#1-7) considered by the Committee were accepted. Five amendments (#1, #2, #3, #4, and #6) delivered small alterations to specific words and minor re-phrasing to make the Resolution more accurate, comprehensive, and inclusive of the evolving security situation in Afghanistan and Allied involvement in the peace and stability process. Two amendments achieved substantive changes; amendment #2 put forth by the United States requested the Resolution welcome other Allied troop increases, while amendments #5 and #7 put forth by Bulgaria and Canada respectively, supported by multiple countries, approved additional text be added to paragraph 13b to complement paragraph 10. This amendment incorporated more fully the Committee’s recognition the peace process in Afghanistan be Afghan-led and be more attentive to and place additional emphasis on good governance. **The draft Resolution [216 DSC 17 E] as amended was adopted.**

## **XIII. Election of Committee and Sub-Committee Officers**

60. The Committee re-elected all eligible officers to their positions. The Defence and Security Committee elected three parliamentarians to fill four available positions: **Joao Rebelo** (Portugal) was elected as **Chairperson of the DSCFC**; **Andreas Loverdos** (Greece) was elected to fill the **Vice-Chairpersonship** position being vacated by Joao Rebelo; **Juozas Olekas** (Lithuania) was elected to the vacant **Vice-Chairpersonship on the DSCFC**; **Juozas Olekas** (Lithuania) was also elected to the **Ukraine-NATO Inter-Parliamentary Council**.

**XIV. Summary of the future activities of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation by Lord CAMPBELL OF PITTENWEEM (United Kingdom), Chairperson of the Sub-Committee**

61. Lord Campbell of Pittenweem presented the future activities of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation. He reminded everyone the joint Seminar with the GSM taking place in Rome from 23-24 of November. He noted the possibility of a visit to Naples on the 25 November where Sub-Committee members would be briefed on NATO's Hub for the South and the complex security challenges emerging from across the Mediterranean, the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond. In 2018, he said the Sub-Committee has proposed trips to both Prague and Budapest. There is also a possibility for a visit later in the year to London and Paris to discuss the issues of EU cooperation and NATO.

**XV. Summary of the future activities of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities by Madeleine MOON (United Kingdom), Vice-Chairperson of the Sub-Committee**

62. Madeleine Moon then presented on the future activities of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities. She reminded everyone this year the Committee focused on security developments in Asia and the Mediterranean. She reviewed the excellent visit to South Korea from 11-14 September, recalling the complexity of the challenges ahead on the Korean peninsula. She announced the Committee's final visit of the year will be to Morocco from 30 October to 1 November, where they will discuss security in North Africa and on the southern periphery of the Mediterranean.

**XVI. Any other business**

63. The Chairman thanked Lord Campbell of Pittenweem and Madeleine Moon for their review of the activities of the Sub-Committees. There were no other questions.

**XVII. Date and place of next meeting**

64. The Chairman announced the date of next full meeting of the Defence and Security Committee meeting will take place in Washington, D.C. during the last week of January in 2018, and the entire Committee will convene again at the joint Committee meetings in February in Brussels, and the Spring Session for 2018 will take place from 25-28 May 2018 in Warsaw, Poland.

**XVIII. Closing remarks**

65. The Chairman thanked all Committee members, guest speakers, and observers for their constructive participation in the debate and proceedings during the meeting. He also extended, on behalf of the entire Committee, gratitude to all those at the Romanian Parliament who worked to make the meetings successful. He also led a special thank you to the team of interpreters for their exceptional performance. Finally, he thanked the Committee Secretary, Committee Director, Committee Coordinator, Committee Research Assistant, and the local assistants for their work. Mr Knops then closed the meeting by wishing everyone an enjoyable remainder of their stay in Bucharest, and a safe trip home. The meeting was adjourned.