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1998: NATO in the 21st Century

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Senator William V. Roth, Jr.
President, North Atlantic Assembly

2 October 1998

I. NATO Entering The 21st Century
II. NATO and the Challenges of the 21st Century World
III. Conclusions And Recommendations
The North Atlantic Treaty
The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (Rome)
Founding Act On Mutual Relations, Cooperation And Security Between Nato And The Russian Federation


For five decades now, Europe and North America have formed a unique community of values and common purpose. NATO remains at the heart of this community, as the forthcoming Washington Summit will once again demonstrate. But the Summit will be much more than a retrospective celebration of past achievements. It should first and foremost look ahead, projecting NATO into the 21st century.

The proposals put forward in this Report by Senator Roth, taking into account ideas provided by a Committee of European and North American members of the NAA, are an imaginative and thought-provoking contribution to this objective. The Report outlines an Alliance responsive to the challenges of today and tomorrow. Its guiding principle is clear: NATO can only shape the changing security environment if it remains itself part of that change. Accordingly, the vision of NATO is a bold one, moving beyond just tinkering at the margins.

Senator Roth provides us with a stimulating personal challenge to many of the accepted "givens" of the late 20th century, in his quest for the full realisation of NATO's stabilising potential. As we approach a new century, the fresh approach taken by Senator Roth warrants our full attention.

I congratulate Senator Roth on this major endeavour.

Javier Solana


The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) approaches its fiftieth anniversary in Aprilð1999 in an era of great change and challenge. The collapse of the Berlin Wall nearly a decade ago marked the beginning of the end of Europe's armed division, a process that concluded with the collapse of the Soviet Union two years hence.

As the Alliance continues to adjust to these very positive and profound developments, it must also address the negative dynamics that have been unleashed by this sea-change in Euro-Atlantic affairs. These include the revival of long-standing ethnic animosities and other political tensions so painfully evident in the Balkans today.

The Alliance must also take into account new geopolitical, economic, and technological forces that are global in character. While these have yielded obvious benefits, they also present significant downsides, for example, having contributed to the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies and weapons of mass destruction and escalated the danger posed by the scourge of terrorism, among other threats. Each of these developments confronts the Alliance and its core mission of collective defense with new opportunities, challenges, and responsibilities. These are among the new world dynamics facing the Alliance as it prepares for its Washington Summit meeting in April 1999. This historic Summit will not only celebrate NATO's first fifty years but is also intended to mark the accession of three new members: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland; to further NATO's "open door" policy; and to formalize revisions to its Strategic Concept that will define how the Alliance addresses the aforementioned challenges and opportunities.

In my capacity as President of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), I initiated this study, NATO in the 21st Century, with the intent of making a constructive contribution to the deliberations now underway on these and other matters concerning the Alliance's future by the NATO governments, the constituent parliaments of the NAA, and above all the citizens of all the NATO nations.

As an Alliance of democracies, NATO more than any other military alliance in history relies upon public support. I hope that the reader of this report will find a vision for the Alliance and a plan for its implementation that ensures NATO's relevance to the underlying interests of the NATO member states and a continuation of the public and parliamentary support from which the Alliance has benefitted over the last half century.

With these goals in mind, the study was initiated soon after I assumed the Presidency of the Assembly in November 1996. A steering group, representing a variety of transatlantic perspectives on NATO, was established to serve as a forum through which to engage the committees of the Assembly and to propose and deliberate the fundamental assertions and recommendations that eventually constituted the body of this report. Stanley R. Sloan, the Congressional Research Service's Senior Specialist in International Security Policy, accepted my request to serve as this project's rapporteur.

Over the course of two years, the steering group met three times to discuss various drafts of this report, and the effort was complemented by a visit of the rapporteur to Belgium in July 1998, to seek the advice and perspectives of officials from NATO Headquarters and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). I am grateful for the warm and thoughtful reception Mr. Sloan received at those posts.

Many people contributed a great amount of time and arduous labor to this project and deserve more thanks than can be provided from a few written words. Members of the steering group not only took the time to read and comment on the report's numerous drafts, but also made special trips across the Atlantic to participate in the group's deliberations.

NAA Secretary General Simon Lunn, NAA Deputy Secretary General David Hobbs, and Catherine Guicherd, Deputy to the Secretary General for Policy Coordination, and their colleagues at the Assembly's Secretariat, particularly Dominique Gins and her team, provided not only invaluable administrative support but also their extensive experience and insight in Alliance matters.

In Washington D.C., Ian Brzezinski of my staff assisted me with the coordination of this effort and provided both constructive approaches to the issues it addresses as well as useful criticism. LouisðGolino and Marie Boyer provided Mr. Sloan exceptional research assistance, and Barbara Hennix, the administrative support crucial to the completion of the many drafts this report endured. I am particularly indebted to Stanley Sloan. His tireless efforts, combined with his extensive knowledge, and, above all, his unsurpassed appreciation for the Alliance, provided the foundation of this report. He deserves much credit for all that is right in this report.

Much of this report is derived from a consensus of views that existed within the steering group. However, it is not a consensus document. The views and recommendations it presents are mine, and I accept full responsibility for its contents.

Senator William V. Roth, Jr.


Bureau of the Assembly

  • Mr. Rafael Estrella (Spain) - Vice-President and Chairman of the Defence and Security Committee
  • Mr. Pedro Holstein-Campilho (Portugal) - Vice-President
  • Mr. Arthur Paecht (France) - Vice-President
  • Congressman Jerry Solomon (United States) - Vice-President
  • Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith (United Kingdom) - Treasurer
  • Mr. Karsten Voigt (Germany) - Former President
  • Mrs Sari van Heemskerck Pillis-Duvekot (Netherlands) - Former Vice-President
  • Senator William Rompkey (Canada) - Former Vice-President
  • Mr. Javier Ruperez (Spain) - Former Vice-President

Assembly Members

  • Congressman Douglas Bereuter (United States) - Head of the US House Delegation
  • Congressman Thomas Bliley (United States) - Chairman of the Economic Committee
  • Congressman Sherwood Boehlert (United States) - Chairman of the Science and Technology Committee
  • Mr. Lothar Ibr¸gger (Germany) - General Rapporteur of the Science and Technology Committee
  • Mr. Wim Mateman (Netherlands) - Chairman of the Mediterranean Special Group
  • Senator Gian Giacomo Migone (Italy) - Chairman of the Civilian Affairs Committee
  • Mr. Jan Petersen (Norway) - Chairman of the Political Committee
  • Mr. Anders Sjaastad (Norway) - Former Chairman of the Defence and Security Committee


  • Mr. Stanley R. Sloan - Senior Specialist in International Security Policy, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress

NAA International Secretariat Staff

  • Mr. Simon Lunn - Secretary General


This North Atlantic Assembly report was prepared under the responsibility of United States Senator William V. Roth, Jr., President of the North Atlantic Assembly, with guidance provided by a steering committee composed of legislators from the European and North American members of the North Atlantic Alliance. The report's conclusions and recommendations are submitted for consideration by NATO governments, parliaments and publics as the Allies revise NATO's Strategic Concept, prepare the next stages of enlargement, and plan for the Alliance's future in the 21st century.

The NATO Summit planned for April 1999 in Washington is an opportunity for the Allies to celebrate NATO's fifty years of success and, more importantly, to lay the foundation for the future. This event must produce a balanced outcome, clearly articulating the reasons for NATO's continued existence, adopting a new Strategic Concept that reflects contemporary security conditions and requirements, and continuing the process of opening NATO to other European democracies. The Allies cannot afford simply to celebrate either historic or recent accomplishments. They must demonstrate foresight and courage to meet the challenges of the 21st century. In this light, the following recommendations are offered.

  • A vision for NATO: NATO in the 21st century should be an enduring political/military alliance among sovereign states whose purpose is to apply power and diplomacy to the collective defense and promotion of Allied security, democratic values, the rule of law, and peace.
  • NATO's purpose is to defend values and interests, not just territory: The Allies at the Washington Summit in April 1999 must strongly reaffirm that the North Atlantic Treaty provides an unequivocal mandate for the collective defense of common values and interests as well as the defense of territory.
  • The United States must sustain its commitment to the Alliance: U.S. commitment to and leading role in the Alliance remain critical to NATO's future viability. At the same time, the active participation of NATO Allies in responses to emerging security challenges in and beyond Europe will be essential to the viability of the Alliance.
  • Strengthen the relationship between NATO and the North Atlantic Assembly: NATO's effectiveness and political vitality ultimately depend on support from parliaments and publics in the member states. In view of the centrality of the democratic process to future security and stability and the contribution made by the NAA to strengthening the process, the relationship of the NAA to NATO should be enhanced through intensified consultations and cooperation.
  • Pace, don't pause, the enlargement process: At the Washington Summit, the Allies should invite Slovenia to begin accession negotiations. Slovenia is qualified for membership. Its invitation would demonstrate that the Allies remain committed to their open door policy without overloading NATO's agenda. Acceptance by the Allies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland today, and of other qualified nations in the coming years, highlights the fact that NATO is organized around transcendent values and goals that do not require an "enemy" to validate their continuing relevance.
  • Integrate NATO's inner and outer core missions: Collective defense against an attack on any Alliance member, as provided in Article 5 of the Treaty, must remain NATO's core mission. In addition, NATO nations must focus increased political attention and defense resources on emerging outer core, non-Article 5, missions, including promoting stability in Europe, dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, responding to the challenge of terrorism and providing options to deal with threats that arise beyond NATO borders. The Allies should ensure that there is a seamless continuum between essential political and military aspects of NATO's inner core and outer core missions and capabilities. In this regard, NATO military authorities should develop training, exercising, deployment and rotation concepts that enable regular forces to maintain combat capabilities while being employed in peace support and other non-Article 5 operations.
  • NATO's missions neither global nor artificially limited: The Allies should neither suggest that NATO's non-Article 5 outer core missions will assume a "global" character nor impose artificial geographic limits on such missions.
  • NATO must preserve its freedom to act: The Allies must always seek to act in unison, preferably with a mandate from the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the framework for collective security in Europe. Even though all NATO member states undoubtedly would prefer to act with such a mandate, they must not limit themselves to acting only when such a mandate can be agreed. All NATO actions should nonetheless be based on appropriate legal authority.
  • NATO must address terrorist challenges: Effective burdensharing in the future will require that all Allies contribute in a demonstrable fashion to the goal of combatting terrorism. NATO should be used more actively as a forum for sharing of intelligence, consultations on counter-terrorist approaches and strategies, and joint actions against terrorist threats.
  • Move relations with Russia beyond arms control: The Allies should use defense cooperation with Russia to move the NATO-Russia relationship beyond Cold War assumptions and arms control relationships toward a qualitatively new level of political and military engagement.
  • Make ESDI real: The European Allies must develop the military capabilities to give real meaning to a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). France should return to full participation in NATO's Integrated Command Structure. If France decides to do so, NATO should divide its Southern command into South-Eastern and South-Western commands to enhance European responsibilities in the region. A European commander and deputy (from France and Spain) should lead the South-Western command; a U.S. officer and European deputy should lead the South-Eastern command.
  • Make NATO defense planning and force goals transparent: At a time when threats are not as self-evident as during the Cold War, public and parliamentary support for defense efforts would benefit from greater transparency concerning defense plans and performance. To this end, NATO should annually prepare, publish and deliver to the President of the North Atlantic Assembly an unclassified report that would assess progress made toward developing capabilities required by NATO's new mission profile and identify the gaps that remain, with recommendations concerning how such shortcomings can be remedied.
  • Build a floor under Allied defense spending:. The Allies should at the Washington Summit call for a voluntary moratorium on further defense budget reductions. The voluntary moratorium should continue until the Allies have decided what capabilities and expenditures are required to implement NATO's revised Strategic Concept.
  • Bridge emerging gaps in military capabilities: The Allies should agree at the Washington Summit to develop a NATO Technology and Industrial Base Strategy. Its objective should be to preserve vital, competitive and complementary defense industrial bases on both sides of the Atlantic, to seek progressive elimination of barriers to defense trade on a NATO-wide basis, to encourage harmonization of competition policies, and to remove barriers that inhibit sharing of technology among Allied states. The Allies should also launch a Coalition Technology Initiative that would establish a specific requirement as part of NATO's annual defense planning process to identify technologies under development that could critically affect, either positively or negatively, the ability of Allied forces to work and fight together in future contingencies. The United States, as the military and technological leader of the Alliance, should devote a high priority in its national planning to the continued ability of its military forces to work in coalition with those of NATO nations.
  • Take missile defense seriously: The Alliance should give urgent attention to missile defense. The proliferation of missile technologies and systems, especially those that can deliver weapons of mass destruction, is an increasingly worrisome security threat. In a time of limited resources, NATO nations need to work together to develop missile defense systems that could preserve the ability of Allied forces to fulfill assigned missions.
  • Face the facts in the Balkans: As long as there is a tinderbox in the Balkans, there can be no stable peace in Europe. NATO's military operation in Bosnia has been a clear success. The experience demonstrates, however, that in such crises decisive action earlier rather than later can save both lives and money. Another clear lesson, particularly with regard to the crisis in Kosovo, is that NATO should threaten military action only when it is clearly and credibly prepared to fulfill that threat. A continued U.S. military contribution to Allied forces operating in the Balkans obviously remains critical for the time being. However, in the future, a European leadership role in the Bosnia operation and in other possible NATO operations in the Balkans should receive increased emphasis.



1. NATO will enter the 21st century as an alliance in transition. As the most successful military alliance in history, NATO remains a voluntary association of sovereign states committed to participate in a collective defense should any member be attacked. But the transatlantic Alliance, based on the North Atlantic Treaty, now is taking on additional roles at the center of an emerging cooperative Euro-Atlantic security system. How much NATO should change in the coming years, and in which directions, are key issues confronting the transatlantic Allies today.

2. The Allies have pointed the way toward a European security system that will be inclusive, rather than exclusive, and therefore toward a NATO that will continue to enlarge its membership to include qualified candidates. Moreover, the Allies have said that they are constructing a "new NATO" that is compatible with, and even critical to, the new political, economic and security realities in Europe. The NATO leaders declared in Madrid in July 1997 that "A new NATO is developing: a new NATO for a new and undivided Europe." But neither the process of enlarging NATO nor of building a "new NATO" is completed. When NATO leaders meet in Washington in April 1999, they are scheduled to make important decisions about further enlargement and NATO's future means and missions. Those decisions will help determine what kind of NATO will enter the 21st century.

3. The 21st century world will likely include many familiar threats and opportunities. But political, economic, environmental and technological change will undoubtedly generate new problems and issues. The Allies will be called on to decide which of these challenges require collective action through the NATO structures and which will be more appropriately handled in other ways.

4. The North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) is NATO's link to the representative bodies of the member states. Although not formally part of NATO, the Assembly since the mid-1950s has provided common ground on which European and Canadian parliamentarians and Members of the U.S. Congress could consider and debate issues affecting the transatlantic Alliance. Over the years, free and open debate in Assembly meetings and serious consideration of policy issues in Assembly reports have made major contributions to a better understanding of NATO and the challenges faced by its member nations. The Assembly acts as a permanent reminder that intergovernmental decisions reached within NATO are ultimately dependent on political endorsement in accordance with the constitutional processes of democratically elected parliaments.

5. Since 1989 the work of the NAA has taken on an added dimension through its policy of active engagement with the new parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe. By providing political reassurance and practical assistance to these parliaments the NAA has helped strengthen the democratic process that lies at the heart of NATO's new mission of projecting stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. The North Atlantic Assembly has directly supported the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program at the parliamentary level. The integration of parliamentarians into all aspects of its work - through the extension of associate membership and the dedicated Rose-Roth program of seminars and staff training - has made an important contribution to the overall Alliance cooperation effort. Assembly outreach activities have focussed on civil-military relations and particularly on improving the parliamentary role in democratic control of armed forces.

6. This special NAA report is intended as a parliamentary contribution to decisions to be taken in coming months that will profoundly influence NATO's future. The report begins with a discussion of what NATO is today, and where the Alliance stands following recent discussions concerning enlargement and internal adaptation. It briefly surveys the possible challenges on the near horizon of the 21st century world. The final section highlights conclusions and recommendations to be forwarded to NATO governments for their consideration.

7. It is hoped that the report's analysis and recommendations will become part of the ongoing intergovernmental review of NATO's roles and missions, as well as help explain NATO's continuing relevance to Alliance parliaments, publics, and non-NATO governments. This goal is in keeping with the Assembly's tradition of providing NATO governments suggestions and constructive criticism concerning critical issues before the Euro-Atlantic community.


8. The ongoing debate about NATO's future includes a variety of perspectives about what NATO is and what it should become. This report begins from the premise that NATO always has been more than simply a defensive alliance, and that the North Atlantic Treaty provides a broad and flexible mandate through which to defend and promote Allied interests and security. Moreover, preserving the attributes of a collective defense system, including an Integrated Command Structure, a vital defense planning process and thoroughgoing political and military consultations, will strengthen NATO's ability to play new roles and assume new missions that respond to the challenges of the post-Cold War era.

NATO is a community of values

9. The North Atlantic Treaty, otherwise known as the "Treaty of Washington" for the fact that it was signed in Washington on April 4, 1949, was designed to counter Soviet expansion and military power. But the Treaty itself was based on common values, identified no enemy, protected the sovereign decisionmaking rights of all members, and was written in sufficiently flexible language to facilitate adjustments to changing international circumstances. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, one of NATO's "founding fathers," urged the creation of a "Western Union" in a speech to the British Parliament on January 22, 1948. He asserted that "our sacrifices during the war, our hatred of injustice and oppression, our party democracy, our striving for economic rights and our conception and love of liberty are common among us all." During negotiation of the Treaty, the government of Canada argued the need to reflect "the ideological unity of the North Atlantic powers." U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson subsequently maintained that "the central idea of the treaty is not a static one..." and that "the North Atlantic Treaty is far more than a defensive arrangement. It is an affirmation of the moral and spiritual values which we hold in common." During 1949 Senate hearings on the Treaty, Acheson and other Truman Administration witnesses argued that what they were proposing was very different from previous military alliance systems.

10. What made NATO different from previous military alliances was that the Treaty's preamble clearly articulated Allied support for "democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." It is true that, during the Cold War, these values occasionally took second place when authoritarian regimes in NATO were tolerated in the interest of maintaining a militarily strong alliance. But NATO's survival beyond the end of the Cold War suggests that its value foundation and the inherent logic of Euro-Atlantic cooperation remain important ingredients in the glue that holds the Alliance together. It is these same factors that make NATO membership so attractive to the new European democracies.

The North Atlantic Treaty provides a broad and flexible mandate

11. The Treaty's relatively simple language does not spell out in great detail how its objectives should be implemented. There is no specified military strategy, no requirement for any particular organization or even military arrangements, beyond the creation of a North Atlantic Council (NAC) and a defense committee. This suggests substantial latitude for adaptation and adjustment to changing circumstances. The only limits on such changes are imposed by national interests, values, inertia, and other human and institutional factors, not by the Treaty.

12. NATO's flexibility has been demonstrated, for example, by the military buildup and elaboration of an Integrated Command Structure in the early 1950s after North Korea invaded South Korea - measures not anticipated when the Treaty was signed. The Alliance was adjusted again following the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954. In the mid-1960s, NATO was forced to adapt to France's departure from the Integrated Command Structure. In 1967, the Allies revamped NATO's strategy with the doctrine of "flexible response" to a possible Warsaw Pact attack. In the same year, they approved the "Harmel Report," which gave the Alliance the mission of promoting détente as well as sustaining deterrence and defense. And, in the 1990s, the Allies have reoriented NATO's goals and activities to take into account the peaceful revolutions that brought democracy to Central and Eastern Europe and gave Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet Republics the opportunity for independence and democratic reform.

NATO is a collective defense system

13. At its founding, the most prominent aspect of the Treaty was its requirement for individual and collective actions for defense against armed attack. Article 3 of the Treaty provides that the Allies "separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." In Article 5, the Treaty's collective defense provision, the Parties agreed that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all ..." They agreed that each Party to the Treaty would "assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

14. During the Cold War, NATO's strategy and the way in which the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom deployed their forces on the continent gave Article 5 more substance in practice than suggested by the words in the Treaty. Beginning in the early 1950s, the United States deployed its military forces and nuclear weapons forward in Europe, mainly in Germany, in a fashion ensuring that a Soviet attack on the West would in its early stages engage U.S. forces, therefore constituting an attack on the United States as well as on the host nation. In the mid-1950s, the United States threatened "massive [nuclear] retaliation" against the Soviet Union should it attack a NATO country. After massive retaliation's credibility was undermined by Soviet acquisition of long-range nuclear weapons, NATO adopted its "flexible response" strategy. Flexible response suggested that battlefield nuclear weapons might be used early in any European conflict. Such weapons were deployed well forward in West Germany to ensure that they were seen as part of NATO's first line of defense.

15. Today, the collective defense commitment still bestows the Treaty of Washington with special meaning. It is an effective deterrent against potential future enemies of the Allies and a source of reassurance should future threats develop. But with no imminent, Soviet-style threat currently facing the Allies, NATO strategy and force deployments are being adapted to fundamentally new circumstances. Most activities of the Alliance have turned toward purposes of defense cooperation that lie beyond collective defense, even though the institutions and processes developed to implement collective defense, including the Integrated Command Structure, remain critically important to NATO's future. Article 5 still provides a continuing rationale for maintaining the Integrated Command Structure and the day-to-day political and military consultation and planning that make NATO a unique facilitator of defense cooperation among the member states.

NATO is a cooperative defense organization

16. NATO has been and always will be a political as well as a military alliance. In recent years, it has been popular to say that NATO would have to adapt to new circumstances by becoming "more political." But NATO's activities in the past and today make clear that its unique role is as an instrument of political and military cooperation among member and partner states. Consultations in the North Atlantic Council and its many subordinate bodies, practical coordination developed in the work of the Military Committee, day-to-day collaboration in the Integrated Command Structure, and now consultation and cooperation with partners, including Russia and Ukraine, are unique and critical to implement NATO's missions. The goals of such cooperation today, however, are more diverse and complex than during the Cold War.

NATO creates policy options for crisis management

17. At the end of the Cold War, the Allies asked themselves if they still needed an elaborate system of political and military cooperation at a time when the Soviet threat had all but vanished. Their answer, in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept of November 1991, was that political consultation and defense cooperation, so essential in the Cold War, could be broadened to include other purposes. NATO cooperation was widely accepted as having facilitated an effective U.S.-led coalition response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, an experience that significantly influenced drafting of the 1991 Strategic Concept. Since that time, most of NATO's military activities have been focussed on non-Article 5 missions, most significantly in Bosnia. The mandate for such activities is found primarily in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty which authorizes cooperation to deal with circumstances that "threaten" the security of one or more NATO members.

18. NATO remains an organization of sovereign nation states in which no member can be compelled to participate in a military operation that it does not support. There is therefore no guarantee that the Allies will respond to any given political or military challenge. But NATO can be used to build political consensus and create military options to implement political goals. The Allies would have fewer credible military options if their military leaders and forces were not working together on a day-to-day basis, developing interoperability of those forces, planning for contingency operations, and exercising their military capabilities. This day-to-day routine develops political and military habits of cooperation that underpin the ability to work together under pressure and, more importantly, under fire.

19. The interests of the Allies are likely to require the application of military force around and beyond Europe in the 21st century. Political-military cooperation that is unique to NATO will give them the option of facing such circumstances as an effective coalition rather than as individual nation states. Taking a collective approach to defense requirements costs each ally less than would re-nationalized defense establishments.

20. NATO defense cooperation is now being used more prominently for political goals beyond its members' borders as well. Perhaps it is for this reason that some see NATO as becoming "more political." The Allies initiated the Partnership for Peace program in 1994 to develop cooperation with non-NATO states. Through the PfP, which allows each partner to negotiate its own framework agreement governing collaboration with NATO, Europe's new democracies have been learning how to develop systems of democratically-controlled armed forces as well as habits of cooperation with NATO nations and neighboring partners. The partnership approach has helped the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland meet the requirements for NATO membership and remains the principal path through which other nations can prepare to enter the Alliance. Through the partnership program, countries that were formally "neutrals" during the Cold War (including Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland) have joined in NATO's efforts to promote stability in and around Europe.

21. The Allies are also using political/military cooperation with Russia as a means to change Russian perceptions of the Alliance and, it is hoped, to change the political relationship between Moscow and NATO by gradually integrating Russia into a cooperative Euro-Atlantic security system. In pursuit of this goal, the NATO Allies authorized negotiations with Russia which produced the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton and other NATO heads of state and government in Paris on May 27, 1997. The Founding Act with Russia can be seen as updating NATO's 1967 "Harmel Report," which stated that NATO's purpose is to promote détente as well as to ensure deterrence and defense. If NATO succeeds, the defense cooperation relationship with Russia, which began with military cooperation in Bosnia, could move beyond the arms control accords that were designed during the Cold War to regulate relationships between parties then in conflict with one another. Moving from a Russia-NATO relationship governed by arms control to one characterized by the transparent, predictable and confidence-building nature of defense cooperation would mark a sea-change in European security.

NATO is an open organization

22. The drafters of the North Atlantic Treaty made it clear in Article 10 that accession to the Treaty would remain open to "any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area ..." This "open door" policy led to the membership of Greece and Turkey in 1952, Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. After the countries of Central and Eastern Europe freed themselves from communism and began establishing democratic systems of government, rejection of their desire for membership in NATO would have repudiated everything for which the North Atlantic Treaty stood in 1949 and all the years since. Acceptance by the Allies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland today, and of other qualified nations in the coming years, highlights the fact that NATO is organized around transcendent values and goals that do not require an "enemy" to validate their continuing relevance.

NATO is a source of stability

23. NATO serves a variety of purposes for individual member states beyond these broadly stated goals. Many such "secondary" agendas help explain why current members of NATO want the Alliance to continue, and why so many countries want to join. For example, former members of the Warsaw Pact do not fear attack from today's Russia, but they see NATO as a guarantee against falling once again into the Russian sphere of influence as well as an insurance policy against any future resurgence of a Russian threat. Most European governments hope that the process of European unification will lead to more intensive security and defense cooperation among European states. But, they continue to see the unique transatlantic link provided by NATO as essential to security in and around Europe. NATO helped provide the framework within which the process of European reconciliation developed after the Second World War and which now supports the ongoing process of European integration. From the U.S. point of view, NATO cooperation is a way to ensure that the burdens of maintaining international stability are fairly shared with like-minded states.

The transatlantic Alliance is at the center of a cooperative European security system

24. Before summarizing a view of what NATO is today, it might be useful to address the question of whether or not NATO is a "collective security" organization. The term "collective security" is often used in today's discussion of NATO's future role. NATO is not a collective security institution. According to its classic definition, "collective security" is a system of interstate relations designed to maintain a balance of power and interests among the members that ensure peaceful relationships within that system. The League of Nations, established after World War I without U.S. participation, is usually regarded as such a system.

25. NATO was from the outset designed as a system of cooperation among member states to deal with challenges and problems originating outside that system, not within it. Granted, NATO has promoted peaceful settlement of problems within the system, in support of its mission of defending against external threats: it helped heal World War II wounds inflicted by Nazi Germany on its neighbors. NATO has served to mitigate conflicts between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, the requirements of collective defense promoted a degree of cooperation between these two NATO members that might have not been realized in NATO's absence. Today, several aspects of NATO's activities actively support the goal of collective security. The NATO-Russia Founding Act, the Partnership for Peace, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, for example, help maintain peaceful and cooperative relations among all states in Europe. Such efforts enhance collective security and make it less likely that any NATO country will be attacked by any other European nation. But when the Allies began preparing for enlargement, they made clear that potential applicants must peacefully resolve ethnic and bilateral differences with their neighbors in order to be seriously considered for NATO membership.

26. From a legal perspective, NATO does not have principal responsibility for collective security in Europe - the North Atlantic Treaty does not suggest such a role. In fact, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe was designed to promote peaceful relations among states "from the Atlantic to the Urals." The 1975 Helsinki Final Act established a series of agreed principles or "rules of the road" to govern relations among states in Europe. The collective security system established within the OSCE framework functions not through balance of power, but through support of the principles for relations among states specified in the Final Act. The OSCE member states (all European states plus the United States and Canada) have adopted further agreements and principles, given the organization some diplomatic tools for conflict prevention, and convene regular meetings under OSCE auspices to try to nip problems in the bud before they develop more serious proportions.

Participation in Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions

Belgium n n n n n n Hungary 1 n n 3 D n
Canada n n n n Latvia 2 n n 4 D n
Denmark n n n n u n Lithuania 2 n n 4 D n
France n n n n n n Poland 1 n n 3 D n
Germany n n n n n n Romania 2 n n 4 D n
Greece n n n n n n Slovakia 2 n n 4 D n
Iceland n n n l n Slovenia 2 n n 3 D n
Italy n n n n n n Armenia n n n
Luxembourg n n n n n n Azerbaijan n n n
Netherlands n n n n n n Belarus n n n
Norway n n n l n Georgia n n n
Portugal n >n n n n n Kazakhstan n n n
Spain n n n n n n Kyrgyzstan n n n
Turkey n n n 4 l n Moldova n n n
United Kingdom n n n n n n Russia n n n
United States n n n n Tajikistan n n
Austria n n n u n Turkmenistan n n n
Finland n n n u >n Ukraine n n n
Ireland n u n Uzbekistan n n n
Sweden n n n u n Bosnia-Herzegovina n
Switzerland n n n Croatia n
Albania 2 n n n F.Y.R. Macedonia 2 n n n
Bulgaria 2 n n 4 D n F.R. Yugoslavia _
Czech Republic 1 n n 3 D n Others 5 n
Estonia 2 n n 3 D n

1 First round candidates for NATO membership
2 Countries which have expressed their desire to join NATO in addition to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
3 Countries invited to begin EU accession talks on March 31, 1998
4 Applicants for EU membership in addition to the six countries referred to above
5 Includes: Andorra, Cyprus (3), the Holy See, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco and San Marino

n = Member
l = WEU Associate Member
D = WEU Associate Partner
u = Observer
_ = Suspended
Prepared by Marie F. Boyer


27. Over the past two years, the Allies have made significant progress toward adapting NATO's membership and missions to the evolving circumstances in Europe and in the world. In July 1997, at Madrid, NATO heads of state and government continued the process of NATO enlargement by inviting the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession negotiations and promising others that the membership door would remain open. Allied leaders also authorized the preparation of a new Strategic Concept to carry the Alliance into the 21st century.

External adaptation

28. One of the most sensitive issues for the Allies has been how to deal with those countries who wish to join the Alliance but who were not invited in Madrid. In addition to pledging that enlargement is an ongoing continuing process, the leaders emphasized the importance for potential candidates to participate actively in the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which was established prior to the Madrid Summit as a consultative forum in which partner states can address security issues with NATO Allies. They also encouraged aspirants to make full use of the Partnership for Peace. The PfP program is being "enhanced" to permit partners to participate in a wider range of NATO activities. The Madrid communique left the clear impression that further progress toward enlargement could be expected at the Washington Summit, even though no commitments were made concerning additional invitations.

29. In Madrid, the Summit leaders declared that evidence of a "new NATO" is also provided by the special relationships established with Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine has not applied for NATO membership but strongly supports the process of NATO enlargement. Kiev's desire for an intensified consultative and cooperative relationship with NATO yielded the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine signed at the Madrid Summit. Although Ukraine is not currently seeking NATO membership, Ukrainian officials have strongly hinted that the Alliance should expect an application in the future.

30. Russia has lobbied strenuously against NATO enlargement while at the same time negotiating a formalized relationship with the Alliance. The NATO-Russia Founding Act is not a "legally" binding document, but it confirms a variety of NATO commitments intended to reassure Russia that its security will not be threatened by NATO enlargement. It repeats the Alliance's pledge that the Allies "have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members ... and do not foresee any future need to do so" and that they do not envision "additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces" on the territory of new members. The Act created a special NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The Council was convened for the first time on July 18, 1997, and has met on numerous occasions since, developing a work plan and establishing a constructive program of consultations and cooperative programs. The Allies have declared that the PJC in no way replaces or interferes with the role of the North Atlantic Council as NATO's decisionmaking body.

Internal adaptation

31. Since the Cold War ended and the Soviet , Union disappeared, the NATO Allies have identified new missions for the Alliance and have sought to establish more effective sharing of Alliance burdens between the United States and the European Allies. In November 1991 the Allies issued a New Strategic Concept, pointing the way toward a more open and flexible alliance able to deal with a wide range of challenges. Toward this end, at a NATO Summit in Brussels in January 1994, the Allies agre, ed to establish Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters in the NATO structure to facilitate rapid and appropriate military responses to new challenges.
32. In Berlin in June 1996, the Allies took a step toward better transatlantic burdensharing in the future, agreeing to facilitate Western European Union (WEU) military operations by making NATO assets available for approved WEU operations and allowing NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander to serve also as the Western European Union's senior military commander. In addition, NATO and the WEU have intensified and regularized consultative arrangements. In Madrid, the Allies agreed to review NATO's New Strategic Concept "to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe's new security situation and challenges," and to have a revised concept ready for the April 1999 Washington Summit. In December 1997, the Allies agreed in principle on a new command structure that reflects the reduced requirements for collective defense and the increased requirements for flexibility.

The future

33. The task of the Alliance now is to move beyond the first phase of enlargement into the 21st century. When the Allies celebrate NATO's 50th anniversary next year and welcome three new members to the Alliance, they will be facing a wide array of future challenges. The Alliance must decide how and when to fulfill its promise to make enlargement a continuing process. Nine candidates still wait outside the door, more perhaps will apply later. The new consultative relationships with Russia and Ukraine must take their place as part of an emerging Euro-Atlantic cooperative security system. Perhaps most importantly, the Allies must prepare and present a strong statement of NATO's Strategic Concept that is compelling for Allied publics and parliaments.

34. Looking well down the road, there will be both challenges and opportunities for the Alliance. Many of these can be extrapolated from the issues facing the NATO Allies in the next year or two. But there are critical longer-term issues that could create uncertainties well into the 21st century. These include, for example, questions about Russia's place in Europe, the balance between U.S. and European roles in the Alliance, the effect of technology on Alliance cohesion, the dangers arising from instability to the south and east of the Alliance and from proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction.


35. , Wh, at kind of world faces the NATO Allies as they approach the 21st century? So far, there is no consensus concerning how best to characterize the international system that is emerging after the end of the Cold War. The NATO Allies are working to shape the international system in ways that will promote enduring peace and stability and democratic values and institutions. But the end result is far from clear.

36. On balance, Europe is a more congenial place than it was during the Cold War. The military confrontation is gone. It is progressively being replaced by a system of cooperative security, underwritten by growing defense cooperation, political consultation, and economic integration. From this perspective, there is a strategic breathing space. But, if taken for granted, that space clearly could dissipate, inviting new tensions and conflict. It is the task of elected officials and policymakers to anticipate new problems and to mitigate their potential impact on the interests of their nations. Moreover, the coming years present a rare historic opportunity to shape the context and environment of European security.

37. A prospective overview of the 21st century world beyond Europe finds a mixed picture. Russia and China, two major powers on the Eurasian land mass, both of whom are nuclear weapons states, remain critical wild cards for the future security of NATO nations. Relations between NATO countries and both Russia and China are poised precariously between elements of cooperation and conflict. Russia's reform process is threatened by strong nationalist and former Communist elements and by the precarious state of its economy. The direction of its political and economic evolution is largely beyond our influence or control. China is becoming a major player in the international economic system. However, its large and growing market stands in stark contrast to its relatively closed political system which denies citizens human rights that are taken for granted in Western democracies.

38. Furthermore, the states that emerged from the former Soviet Union in the Caucasus and Central Asia are likely to remain a potential source of instability and uncertainty well into the 21st century. Even if states in this region are able to move toward reform and democracy, progress is likely to be slow and instability may raise issues that create tensions in Europe more broadly.

39. To Europe's south, the Middle East is a bubbling cauldron. The Middle East peace process holds hope for increased stability in the region, but fundamental differences and tensions between Israel and its neighbors appear likely to persist well into the 21st century. Radical regimes in Libya, Iraq and Iran could endanger regional stability as well as international access to vital sources of energy.

40. Threats of terrorism and motivations to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are consequences of dissatisfaction with the status quo. Weapons of mass destruction remain potentially powerful tools for those who hope to gain advantage over their adversaries. The poor condition of Russian military forces and potential political instability in Russia raise concerns that Russian nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of radical regimes or terrorists. There is also concern that Russian scientists and engineers with expertise in nuclear, chemical, biological and missile technologies will sell their skills and knowledge , to those whose intentions are by no means benign. Chinese political objectives and desires to profit from the international arms market may conflict with NATO nonproliferation goals. Instability in Russia or China as well as threats to the peace in the Middle East therefore raise profound challenges for the future.

41. In addition, conditions of poverty, famine and internecine conflict in many regions of the world remain potential time bombs. Migrations from south to north may create political and resource issues for NATO nations, particularly in the south of Europe. Natural resource availability will remain a source of tension and potential conflict. Global environmental change could well exacerbate these conditions. Until underlying economic, social and political problems are resolved or ameliorated, these conditions in Africa, Asia and elsewhere will continue to challenge global security.

42. The 21st century world will undoubtedly be host to an even more rapid pace of technological change than that experienced in this century. Technological advance can have both positive and negative effects on societies and their security, but it is in any case inevitable.

43. Although technology may be giving rise to new challenges, it is likely that political and economic relationships will carry forward familiar challenges from the 20th century. In spite of an immense area of common interests built on a foundation of shared values, the NATO nations are all unique products of their historical experiences and cultural backgrounds. The resulting diversity, which on the one hand brings to the Alliance many strengths, also poses difficulties. Those difficulties will, in the 21st century, likely continue to include varying outlooks, for example, on dealing with questions of when and how to use force on behalf of Alliance goals, how to deal with unfriendly regimes, and how best to relate to one another in the Alliance.

44. In the early stages of the 21st century, no one nation is likely to be able to match the political, economic and military strength of the United States. This unique position of the United States in an alliance among equals will continue to raise concerns in Europe about excessive American influence and issues in the United States about inequitable burdensharing.
45. In the coming decades, the process of European integration may produce a sufficiently cohesive Europe to yield a more equitable sharing of both responsibilities and burdens in the Alliance. The imminent steps toward European monetary union may exert a strong force toward greater political union. But at the same time, the parallel process of enlarging the membership of the European Union will make political union more elusive. For at least the next decade, Europe is therefore likely to remain a collective of individual states which find themselves increasingly dependent on one another and on their common institutions, but which are not ready to take the final steps into full political union.

46. Another issue that will likely persist in the 21st century is how to maintain an international economic system that meets the individual and common needs of the states in that system. Today's international economic system is essentially one that invites competition, and therefore a degree of conflict, but which works successfully only when the competition is tempered by compromise and then cooperation. Nevertheless, in the 21st century it seems likely that trade and economic issues will from time to time create tensions among NATO nations, and that policymakers will continually be challenged to maintain a balance of costs and benefits that ensures continued political commitment to the system.

47. The world confronting the NATO Allies as they enter the 21st century is one that promises continuing challenges and opportunities. It is impossible to predict what kind of world will emerge in ten, twenty or thirty years. But it is possible for nations to seek to shape that future in positive ways. That is the task before the NATO Allies to which this report now turns.

Toward stability in Central/Eastern Europe

48. At least in theory, there is the possibility that old enmities and issues could give rise to other sources of instability in Central and Eastern Europe. But these destabilizing dynamics have already been diminished by the process of bringing the nations in this region into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The desire to join NATO has encouraged all potential candidates in the region to settle their outstanding differences with their neighbors, some of which date back centuries. As long as NATO and the European Union continue the process of enlarging, the area of peace and stability once limited to Western Europe can spread to include the rest of Europe as well. The greatest threat to stability in this region would be the perception that some nations will be left outside the process. Such a perception could give rise to new anxieties and old disputes that could be difficult to control or moderate.

49. Whether or not Ukraine continues on a democratic, independent path is a critical variable in the future of European security relationships. Instability in Ukraine or constraints on its sovereignty could call into question the security and interests of all states in the region. It is also critical that the Baltic states continue on a path toward full integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

No peace in Europe with a tinderbox in the Balkans

50. There cannot be peace and security in Europe as a whole if there is a tinderbox in the Balkans. The peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not likely to become self-sustaining in the next few years. However, the NATO commitment to provide a security environment there creates the opportunity for the process of reconciliation and reconstruction to move ahead.

51. Despite the remarkable progress that has occurred over the years since the signing of the Dayton Accords and deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force, the Alliance will be devoting forces and money to Balkan stability for some time to come. Although this can be regretted as an unwelcome burden for the Alliance, the Bosnia experience has had two important silver linings: First, it has been remarkably successful and has thereby strengthened appreciation for NATO's relevance in the post-Cold War world. Second, the Allied operation demonstrated the validity of NATO's new mission concepts. NATO's role in the peace process has been facilitated by a multinational task force that in everything but name only has been a "combined joint task force." This task force - first called the Implementation Force (IFOR) and now called the Stabilization Force (SFOR) - has relied on a critical U.S. leadership role, but European Allies now contribute the bulk of forces on the ground in Bosnia. Partner countries, including Russia, have been constructively incorporated in the operation. However, ensuring peace in the Balkans will remain a concern for the NATO Allies in the 21st century until that region has settled into patterns of normal political and economic relationships emulating those in the rest of Europe.

The Mediterranean/Middle Eastern region will remain a source of tension and conflict

52. Unfortunately, it seems likely that the "greater Middle East" will remain a source of tension, conflict and challenge to the interests of NATO members well into the 21st century. It is in this region that we find both classic and "new" security issues. This region is, and is likely to remain, of strategic importance to both Europe and the United States. Proximity to Europe is one factor, as conflicts in the Mediterranean region could have spillover effects on European nations. Acquisition by rogue states in the region of long-range missile capabilities combined with weapons of mass destruction could pose imminent threats to European states in the region as well as to U.S. forces there.

53. U.S. and European reliance on Middle Eastern sources of energy is another key factor. That reliance does not seem likely to change fundamentally in the coming decades, and is made more dangerous by the fact that many of the sources of energy in the region are not governed by democratic regimes and therefore are potentially unstable and unreliable.

54. Despite significant progress in the Middle East peace process over the last two decades, relations between Israel and most of its neighbors remain unsettled. The Palestinians have moved closer toward the goal of a homeland and a system of self-governance but the relationship between their society and Israeli society remains tension-filled. Attacks on Israeli civilian targets by Arab terrorists and retaliatory strikes on suspected terrorist bases remain a continuing part of daily life in the region. Although Israel's relations with Egypt were largely stabilized by the Camp David Accords, relations with its other neighbors remain frequently tense and filled with potential conflict.

55. The United States feels a particularly strong commitment to the defense of its ally Israel, a commitment not equally shared by other NATO Allies. The European approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is on balance more critical of Israel than that of the United States, frequently creates differences in U.S. and European strategies toward problems in the region. This transatlantic perceptual gap seems likely to persist into the 21st century. Because U.S. and European interests will be affected by tensions and conflicts in this region, the NATO Allies will be challenged to find common approaches to problems there even if they assess the sources of conflict somewhat differently.

56. Differences between members of the Alliance and their policies toward Libya, Iraq and Iran are already significant sources of transatlantic tension and are likely to continue. Some of these regimes may not survive their current leaders, and these states may not forever pose challenges to stability in the region. But as long as the current regimes persist, they could continue to pose risks for U.S. and European interests. Just as in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, differentiated U.S. and European responses to and strategies toward these states will likely pose challenges to Allied cooperation. A radical regime in Algeria could become another possible source of instability in the region.

57. The many sources of instability in this region highlight the importance of Turkey's continued active commitment to the Alliance and its goals and its progress toward eventual membership in the European Union.

58. Beyond such "traditional" challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, this region contains the potential for new sources of concern. When military conflicts, natural disasters, famines or other circums, tances make life intolerable in a given country, populations may try to move to safer locations. Such forced migrations in the Mediterranean region pose threats to NATO members in the region. As long as these sources persist, as seems likely in the 21st century, NATO countries will be challenged to take the steps necessary to try to prevent or mitigate the effects of such mass migrations. These and related issues will more often than not call on the political and economic resources of the NATO countries rather than use of their military forces. But a non-threatening, cooperative NATO presence in the Mediterranean region can provide reassurance to friendly governments and contribute to stability and the security interests of the Allies.

Terrorism will be a continuing threat

59. Terrorism, whether state-supported or independently organized, will remain a challenge to the interests of the Euro-Atlantic countries. Particularly at a time when the NATO countries ought to be able to deter or defeat most potential traditional military challenges, rogue states or radical groups may be more likely to try to challenge them through "asymmetric" strategies - for example, by putting civilian populations at risk. Both the United States and the European Allies are potential targets for terrorists seeking to promote their political goals. As long as economic disparities, political dissatisfaction, or radical ideologies persist, NATO countries will be forced to concern themselves with terrorist threats and, when warranted, to use military force to deter or defeat them.

60. While potential sources of tension are likely to increase in the 21st century, so will the variety and capability of the technological threats that NATO will face. Technology provides the tools for equipping NATO's armed forces but it also provides potential adversaries with the means for posing new threats. For example, despite export controls and agreements such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, during the first decades of the next millennium some nations antagonistic toward Western interests will have access to the capacity to develop chemical and biological weapons along with ballistic and cruise missiles to deliver them. And despite recent progress in nuclear arms control, the prospect of additional nations acquiring nuclear weapons technology and their delivery means cannot be ruled out, as amply demonstrated by India and Pakistan in 1998.

61. Exports of sophisticated conventional weapons are an additional source of concern. Declining domestic defense markets in nations with advanced defense industries have led manufacturers to rely more heavily on markets abroad and to offer sophisticated systems to prospective customers. Furthermore, the growing convergence of civil and military technologies, combined with the spread of industrialization, will greatly improve indigenous capacities to develop sophisticated weaponry. Consequently, NATO nations could face adversaries who are equipped with some combination of hi-tech air- and missile-defense systems, highly capable offensive and defensive aircraft, land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles or a variety of other advanced systems. In the future, the submarine threat could worsen as the technologies of non-nuclear air-independent propulsion systems become more widely available. These enable submarines to remain submerged for weeks rather than days. Such systems could disrupt sea lines of communication and amphibious operations that are crucial to the success of many operations beyond NATO's borders.

62. In addition, there is a growing concern about nations or sub-national groups exploiting information technology to disrupt civil and military infrastructure. Presuming that NATO will maintain its current edge in traditional military systems over potential challengers, it will be increasingly attractive for adversaries to attack the information systems of NATO countries with adaptable viruses, to feed disinformation into those systems, or to seek to destroy or disrupt them in other ways.

63. In the 21st century, then, NATO countries must be prepared for potential adversaries to use asymmetric strategies, employing accessible and disruptive technologies against NATO's superiority in traditional weapons technologies. As the NATO nations rely increasingly on information systems to maintain both their societies and military systems, they become more vulnerable to information warfare. And, emerging technology will give small, subnational groups in the 21st century destructive potential heretofore available only to nation states.

"Environmental" factors could create instability

64. Beyond the classical power- and ideologically-based sources of instability, security challenges in the 21st century could also emerge from developments in the global environment. Growing populations, degradation of agricultural land, pollution and overuse of water resources, depletion of fish stocks, and deforestation are already creating instability by cutting economic growth, and in extreme cases, producing large numbers of refugees. There is also the prospect that these problems will be aggravated by global climate change.

65. For instance, the population of most countries in Africa, the Middle and Near East is expected to double in the next thirty years. In 2020, less than 20 percent of the world's population will be living in developed nations. Combined with this population growth, agricultural productivity in Northern Africa and Southern Europe could decline dramatically. Worsening water shortages in regions such as the Middle East could give rise to conflict. Around the world, about 200 river basins are multinational, including 57 in Africa and 48 in Europe. Plans by one nation to increase its use of a shared water resource could easily cause tension or even conflict. Furthermore, rises in sea levels could displace coastal populations and pollute fresh water aquifers. In parts of the Middle East, access to scarce water supplies is an existing source of tension and projects to build dams in parts of Eastern Europe and Turkey have already generated disputes. While it is not possible to specify the precise consequences of environmental degradation, the trend will certainly be towards greater tension and sources of conflict in regions which are already politically volatile.

Russia could be a future friend or foe

66. Most of the potential challenges discussed above have very little or nothing to do with direct threats or risks posed by Russia. In fact, Russia could well be more a part of the answer to these security challenges than a security problem. In an optimistic scenario, a reforming Russia would continue to make contributions to international peace and stability, as it has in Bosnia, and would more often than not be an ally of the Euro-Atlantic nations in the international system. In such a case, Russia's relationship with the NATO Allies, developed through the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, would increasingly become an important part of the formula for international peace and stability.

67. Objectively defined, Russia's political, economic and security interests will be best served by an increasingly cooperative relationship with the Euro-Atlantic nations. Nonetheless, it is possible that, in the 21st century, internal developments could take Russia in different directions. Russia's democratic institutions and traditions are nascent, resting on very weak foundations. Russia remains more of a corrupt oligarchy than a democracy. Its economy is sustained largely by massive loans and assistance from international lending institutions. People in Russia are restless, demoralized and angry. Russian foreign policy is a mixture of pragmatic cooperation with the West, yearning for past great power status, and the continued assertion of hegemonic claims over the space of the former Soviet Union.

68. The threat from Russia to regional and global security would be rekindled if their transition to a democratic market system under a rule of law broke down. Russia, facing the potential failure of political and economic reform, might retrogress to an autocratic, chauvinistic, insular state threatening its near and far abroad. Russia's future political leaders could decide that Moscow needs to keep a degree of tension in its relationship with the West in order to sustain a form of authoritarian rule. Or, Russian leaders could decide to align with China in an anti-Western coalition. Both cases could pose serious challenges to international peace and stability and to the interests of NATO countries.

NATO's interests are affected by developments in Asia

69. Due to technological change and consequent economic change, we now face an increasingly interdependent globe. Developments in Asia can no longer be viewed as irrelevant to the interests of the NATO nations. The financial crises in Asia have demonstrated that Asian financial security and economic health cannot be separated from the well-being of the nations in the Euro-Atlantic region.

70. One of the most important uncertainties facing the NATO Allies in the 21st century is the question of China's future role. Will China, with the world's largest population, impressive natural resources, growing military potential, and a Communist system of government, become a rogue superpower? Or will China become so intertwined in the global economic system that its society and government evolve toward greater pluralism and a non-threatening place in the international system? Today, the NATO Allies can neither be sure of nor discount the possibility that China will become a major security threat in the future.

71. In addition, North Korea presents a continuing threat to peace on the Korean peninsula. Korea has never been perceived as a "NATO problem," and dealing with stability in the region has largely been left to the United States. But the end of tension in this area or, conversely, the advent of war, would profoundly affect the interests of all NATO countries.

72. Tensions in south Asia between India and Pakistan now have taken on more threatening dimensions, as any future conflict there now seems increasingly likely to risk the use of nuclear weapons. The "threat" of nuclear weapons proliferation now is the reality of relations between India and Pakistan.

73. On the other hand, Japan is a significant and constructive participant in the international system. Japan's own interests rely on international peace and stability, in Europe and the Middle East as well as in Asia. The challenge to the Euro-Atlantic community with regard to Japan is to help Japan take on greater responsibility for peace and stability in its region and to make contributions to international security more generally.

NATO will need a more flexible and diverse approach to its mission

74. This changing and diverse world of potential threats, risks and challenges suggests the NATO Allies will have to take a flexible approach to the defense of their interests in the 21st century world. The potential for future threats to the territorial integrity of NATO nations, albeit small at the moment, is one that cannot be ignored. The situation in Bosnia has demonstrated that NATO countries will require the ability to deploy military forces in coalition operations beyond national borders. It appears clear that, in both cases, NATO will be the best framework for the preparation and coordination of Allied approaches to such challenges.

75. NATO in the 21st century undoubtedly will benefit from policies that seek to prevent international conflict through the use of consultation and cooperation with non-members. When the Allies can use diplomacy to prevent misunderstandings, remove sources of potential conflict, mediate differences, or deter threats, actual challenges to their interests will be substantially reduced.

76. The Allies will have to determine when NATO should be used to deal with new challenges such as terrorism, proliferation, mass migration, and other possible threats to the interests of NATO nations. In the 21st century world, other organizations, particularly the United Nations, may be more effective in dealing with some of these challenges. For example, it will be important to ensure that Japan and other developed states outside the Euro-Atlantic area assume a fair share of such burdens. On the other hand, the NATO Allies may not want to count on the UN structures in all cases. The NATO framework, with its potential for effective consultations and coordinated action, may be critically important in some circumstances. In any case, the reliable coalition framework provided by NATO seems likely to be one of the important points of stability in the international system in the 21st century world.

77. The North Atlantic Treaty imposes no formal constraints on the ability of the Allies to decide to use their cooperative framework to deal with challenges that do not qualify as Article 5 (collective defense) missions. There is no limit on what kind of operations can be envisioned. There is no restriction on what forces and weapons can be brought to bear. There are no geographic constraints on where operations can be conducted.

78. In practice, however, there are some real political constraints. Very few Allies, for example, would likely support using NATO for an operation in Asia. But there is a real possibility that the Allies will face decisions concerning use of NATO structures even closer to home but beyond Europe's borders, for example in the Middle East or in Africa. Just as NATO's operation in Bosnia - beyond NATO's Article 5 geographic parameters, as defined by Article 6 - is unprecedented, the use of NATO outside of Europe would be so as well. But, as noted above, the most likely challenges to peace and the interests of NATO members will likely emerge in the Mediterranean region in the 21st century. Today, it looks as if there is no way that agreement could be reached in the Alliance in advance about reactions to such hypothetical contingencies. The Allies probably will leave such decisions until they are confronted by a real-life scenario. The problem is that by not deciding the Allies could de facto eliminate options, because they would limit the ability of NATO military authorities to plan and practice operations far from NATO territory and in a wide range of geographic and climatic conditions.

79. The emerging Euro-Atlantic security system clearly requires effective interaction between NATO and other organizations beyond the NATO structure. In terms of NATO's future missions, the question of NATO's relationships to the United Nations and to the OSCE are critical. NATO Allies have said that they would entertain requests from both organizations to undertake a specific peace operation.

80. Under current and foreseeable circumstances, very few NATO Allies would be willing to engage the Alliance in a non-Article 5 mission without some sort of politically sustainable international legal basis for the operation. All, including the United States, would prefer that such a mandate come from the United Nations, giving the operation the broadest possible international support. An OSCE mandate, if relevant, would be welcome, even though it would represent a less universal political base. The issue that could arise in the next century could be in a case where neither a UN nor an OSCE mandate is possible, perhaps due to opposition from Russia. Not only would such an instance threaten to sour NATO-Russian relations, but it could also create serious divisions among the Allies, between those willing to go ahead without a mandate and those reluctant to do so. The Kosovo conflict has already posed this issue quite directly.

NATO must meet the enlargement challenge

81. NATO has pledged that the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Alliance will not be the last phase of enlargement, and that the door to NATO membership will remain open to other states who wish to join and meet the requirements for membership. In spite of this general agreement, articulated at Madrid and since, the Allies remain uncertain concerning how to move ahead. Some would prefer to pause after the Washington Summit. Others have strongly advocated giving enlargement a "southern dimension" by including Romania and/or Slovenia in the next enlargement group. Some in Northern Europe, however, object to moving ahead with these two countries without giving due consideration to the desires of the Baltic states to join.

82. Having begun the process, the Allies must demonstrate their commitment to the open door when Allied leaders meet in Washington next April. Not doing so would seriously upset current expectations about the future in Europe. This could diminish the enthusiasm with which candidate states have embraced the PfP and could stimulate destabilizing renationalization of defense policies. Current divisions among the Allies suggest that the preparations for the Washington Summit could become mired in disagreement about whether or not to invite one or more new members at that time and, if so, which ones. This question must be resolved in advance of the Summit to avoid tarnishing this celebration of NATO's 50th anniversary.

83. The broad options for the Allies at Washington include: inviting one or more candidates to begin negotiations for membership; putting all current candidates on the "starting line" with the assumption that each one will move toward membership at its own pace; or issuing no invitations at Washington but agreeing that one or more countries will be invited to join at a subsequent NATO Summit. Of these options, only a formal invitation to at least one country will send a clear signal that the door is open, and it now appears that only one country, Slovenia, currently meets the guidelines for an invitation. The starting line approach is one way to suggest the door remains open, but all candidates are already effectively in the race and may not see this option as significantly altering the status quo. Kicking the problem down the road to a subsequent NATO Summit buys time but it also raises the danger that the membership door will be perceived closed by candidates or as susceptible to closure by Russia.

84. In addition, it appears that one or more former neutral states will eventually apply for membership. The Allies must be prepared to anticipate the possibility of an Austrian application in coming years as well as from Sweden and Finland somewhat further down the road, perhaps in combination with the prospect of Baltic states joining the Alliance.

85. Adding three new members to NATO's membership will not fundamentally change the NATO decisionmaking dynamic. Procedurally, developing consensus among nineteen states will not be significantly more difficult than among the current sixteen members. From a substantive perspective, in the foreseeable future, the new members seem less likely to pose problems for consensus than do some current members.

86. When the number of NATO members grows beyond nineteen, the political, social, cultural and economic diversity of the Alliance will increase. Consequently, fostering a consensus within the Alliance will become a greater challenge. This presents a trade-off against the benefits promised by NATO enlargement which include an undivided Europe with more and more states whose enhanced sense of security will yield greater regional stability. This trade-off is one that Allies must consider when examining each potential candidate for NATO membership. In the end, unqualified acceptance of and adherence to the Alliance's goals and missions will best indicate that a new ally will also be a "good ally."

87. The decisionmaking challenge for an enlarging Alliance will be to seek full participation in NATO decisions that are made in a timely fashion and missions that respond effectively to security challenges. NATO's goal has always been for all Allies to support and participate in Allied responses to security challenges. In some cases, as in the past, one or more Allies may not physically participate in a given action, but will support that action with their political assent. If, on the other hand, one or more Allies are not able to join in a proposed action, current NATO practice already allows them to use the "silence procedure" of not objecting to an action favored by the other Allies. (It should be clear, even when Allies do not participate in a NATO action, however, that officers and enlisted personnel they have allowed to assume positions in the Integrated Command Structure would not be withdrawn from that structure under any circumstances.) If one or more Allies are so strongly opposed to a proposed action that they would block a consensus, those Allies who wish to act would be required to form an ad hoc coalition outside the formal NATO setting.

88. Clearly, such a decisionmaking challenge will require that political consultations among NATO countries be timely, open, and thorough. As NATO membership grows, it will be critical to ensure that NAC procedures remain sufficiently flexible to permit the Allies to deal with the more complex security environment likely to be encountered in the 21st century.

The NATO command structure will require further adaptation

89. The reform of NATO's command structure agreed in 1997 is a step in the right direction, but will not be the end of the process of reform. As new nations join the Alliance, the structure will, at a minimum, require adjustment to their participation. The Allies will also need to find an approach that will allow France to return to full military participation without prejudicing the effectiveness of the structure. This challenge will require the Allies to look again at some fundamental issues, for example concerning whether NATO's European members should be given additional command responsibilities and whether or not a geographic organization or a new functional organization could best deal with the anticipated challenges of the 21st century world.

90. To meet the diverse challenges of the 21st century world, the Allied approach to defense planning will have to be constantly adapted to an evolving new mission orientation. The Defense Planning Process must be increasingly focussed on the requirements of force projection and force flexibility to support coalition approaches to future contingencies. However, the system will not work effectively unless the Allies are more forthcoming in providing NATO's military planners and commanders with force commitments for non-Article 5 operations than they have so far.

Keeping the PfP and EAPC relevant

91. The PfP and the EAPC may be perceived as of diminishing relevance as additional countries join NATO. However, the enlargement process may stretch over many years, and as long as there are countries in Europe who have not joined NATO and who desire to join or to cooperate, both the PfP and the EAPC will have to be sustained. The Partnership remains a way for countries that wish to join NATO to develop the capabilities and capacities necessary to become a member. PfP members at the beginning of the 21st century will already have the possibility of assigning liaison officers at several working levels of the NATO command structure. The PfP Planning and Review Process will help develop greater operational compatibility between the military forces and establishments of NATO and non-NATO countries. The EAPC will provide a consultative forum between NATO and non-members. The immediate issue about the EAPC, however, is whether this forum will be given any operational role, particularly with regard to decisionmaking for peace operations that involve significant participation by partner countries.

U.S. and European roles in the Alliance still require rebalancing

92. NATO in the 21st century will require clear and substantial political and military involvement by the European Allies as well as continuing U.S. commitment and leadership. Burdensharing is a perpetual issue in an alliance of sovereign nation states, all of whom seek maximum benefit from the relationship at a cost that does not threaten domestic spending priorities. The Alliance will never reach a burdensharing nirvana, in which all Allies are completely satisfied by the balance between their costs and benefits. However, the historic levels of burdens borne by the United States are increasingly difficult to justify in relation to the affluence of European members of the Alliance. Constant attention to the overall balance of roles and responsibilities, both among European countries and between Europe and North America, will be required to keep the Alliance in business.

93. The only way that the European Allies can maximize their contribution to the Alliance and maintain an effective balance of burdens and responsibilities between Europe and the United States is to combine their efforts whenever possible. Some have argued that Europe will only get its act together if the United States ends military integration with the Allies and requires the European Allies to become self-reliant. If the only end were to force European self-reliance, perhaps this strategy could be advised for the 21st century. The consequences, however, could also include U.S.-European strategic drift and ineffective, rather than more effective, sharing of defense burdens. Consolidation of European efforts must not come at the cost of diminished transatlantic cooperation and weakened defense integration.

94. It seems most likely that the interests of all NATO nations will be best served by a continued process of sharing, not dividing, transatlantic defense burdens and responsibilities in the 21st century. Such an approach is not likely to produce immediate, dramatic shifts in the U.S.-European burdensharing relationship, but it does offer the possibility of evolutionary change toward more substantial European roles and responsibilities without the risk of strategic disconnect.

ESDI must develop within a vital transatlantic security system

95. The European Union in the 21st century will increasingly be the center for decisionmaking affecting the day-to-day aspects of European life. Monetary union will force the pace of integration in a wide variety of sectors. Eventually, monetary union may be the engine that pulls political union closer to reality. The powerful force of national identities and the desire to protect national sovereignty and unique ways of life in virtually all European countries, however, will ensure that the process of integration will remain an evolutionary process. In addition, particularly as the European Union enlarges its membership, the development of Europe will likely follow the model of concentric circles. A smaller group of states will constitute the most advanced core of integration with several other levels of participation including other European states. Nothing like a "United States of Europe" should be expected to emerge, at least in the early decades of the 21st century.

96. As long as there is no true political union in Europe, and a variety of levels of integration within the EU framework, the defense efforts of the European Allies cannot be fully integrated. This suggests that the Western European Union will have a continuing role to play as the embodiment of the European defense identity in NATO and the center for European defense cooperation in the European Union. This critical role as a bridge between NATO and the European Union and between a Europe of sovereign states and a fully integrated Europe, will likely be necessary for the foreseeable future. Whatever organizational changes are made in the future, they should guarantee that the process of European defense integration remains compatible with and supportive of a vital transatlantic security system.

97. European Allies will not be able to constitute a strong and reliable European element of the Alliance unless they can consolidate European arms industries. The current structure of European armaments industries is inefficient, built for a time when national firms (often called "national champions") could be sustained by national defense acquisition requirements supplemented by exports and supported by extensive subsidies. Today, the markets are smaller and money available to subsidize an inefficient base is limited. This is especially the case in light of recent and projected cuts in defense spending. The European Economic and Monetary Union project will make it difficult for European governments to narrow the growing gap between the European and American defense industrial bases.

98. In the United States, four manufacturers - Lockheed Martin, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon - have emerged as leading contractors for large defense projects. By contrast, the European base is fragmented into many companies. Until Europe creates a more unified market for defense goods which fosters the creation of pan-European defense firms, there will be few European firms to rival their American counterparts in scale, scope and competitive advantage. The result will be higher procurement costs in Europe and perhaps even greater protectionism which will further shorten the scope for transatlantic defense industrial exchange and could lead to trade tensions. Transatlantic defense cooperation and trade foster interoperability, reduce overall defense costs, and provide the competition necessary to spark innovation and cost reductions. Europe is moving too slowly in consolidating the defense business, and unless the effort is galvanized, the current transatlantic gap will become much wider in the next century.

99. In spite of these arguments, there are some major obstacles to consolidation of the European defense industrial base. The first is France's desire to maintain governmental control of its defense industry. Although France's position has started to change in favor of more emphasis on restructuring of defense firms, France continues to have reservations about linking its state-owned companies with other European industries. The second obstacle is continuing high levels of unemployment throughout Europe. Defense industry consolidation requires mergers of companies and would result in the loss of thousands of jobs, adding to the existing unemployment drag on European economies and European social welfare systems. The third obstacle is lack of harmonization in European tax policies, social policies, corporate law and military procurement policies.

100. These and other obstacles have blocked otherwise logical consolidations of European defense production capacities in the past and could continue to do so in the future without strong European governmental commitments to reform. Moreover, in the absence of a more intense and comprehensive EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, transnational European defense industrial cooperation is likely to continue to feature formation of small groupings of defense companies rather than creation of European-level "champions."

Technological change could undermine NATO's ability for coalition operations

101. In order to respond effectively to potential future threats, NATO will have to field a spectrum of technologies to defend its forces and territory against a variety of missile threats. At the same time, NATO forces will need to be equipped with appropriate means to retaliate against the use of weapons of mass destruction and, ideally, to prevent an adversary from using such weapons.

102. The United States is at the forefront of these efforts and there are already concerns that its Allies are falling behind in some of the relevant technological fields. In the coming decades, these concerns could become seriously detrimental operational realities. In addition to creating political and economic frictions over potential U.S. dominance of the market in new weapons technologies, a widening technological gap could seriously undermine NATO's capacity for coalition operations. New technologies will facilitate conducting warfare in radically different ways using new weapons and concepts of military operations that its Allies would be unable to emulate.

103. The United States is now the only nation with a well-developed space-based infrastructure. Despite growing European interest in developing space-based military assets, the gap in capability is still widening. In the next few years, advances in micro-electromechanical systems technology, micro-robots, directed energy weapons, and electronics could present opportunities which the United State believes it cannot afford to miss and which its Allies cannot afford to develop and exploit. In addition, NATO will be challenged to find coordinated ways to keep pace with and take advantage of commercially developed and openly available technologies (e.g. communications, virtual reality, human-computer interface, geo-location and mapping technologies), access to which will be difficult to deny to potential adversaries.

NATO will be challenged to examine its nuclear strategy and doctrines

104. Several developments, including NATO's enlargement, the evolving relationship with Russia, France's closer cooperation with NATO and the process of developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy among the members of the European Union may call on the NATO Allies to give more thorough attention to NATO's nuclear policies and posture in the next few years. In the context of a dramatically changed threat environment, the NATO Allies may need to develop new perspectives on the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy and perhaps some new consultative means to deal with those issues.

105. NATO membership includes three nuclear powers - the United States, France and the United Kingdom. These three countries seem likely to remain nuclear powers for the foreseeable future, certainly well into the 21st century. NATO's 1991 New Strategic Concept declared that "The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war." The concept placed principal reliance on the strategic nuclear capabilities of the United States, France and the United Kingdom. But it also asserted that peacetime basing of nuclear forces on European territory (meaning the residual deployment of a few hundred U.S. free-fall bombs with dual-use aircraft in several European countries) "provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance." Even in the extreme case of a newly antagonistic Russia, these free-fall bombs would likely be the least credible component of any Western response to a Russian military threat. The apparent conclusion is that, from a military perspective, the bombs are largely intended as place-holders, designed to keep open the option of deploying alternative nuclear systems from the U.S. arsenal in support of NATO strategy.

106. Politically, the most important rationale for a continuing U.S. nuclear presence in Europe is that virtually all European governments apparently still believe that the American military presence in Europe, including direct ties to U.S. strategic nuclear systems, makes a significant contribution to European stability and peace. In addition, the continued presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe may be seen by some European states as providing the rationale for continued active consultations in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group on nuclear weapons issues.

Internal frictions threaten NATO cohesion

107. At a time when most external threats to the interests of NATO members seem likely to arise in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions, it is tragic that two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, still see each other as potential adversaries. Unless these two Allies can find compromise solutions to the problems that divide them, particularly concerning Cyprus, it will be more difficult, if not impossible at times, to arrange effective NATO coalition responses to future challenges to peace and stability in the region. Even though NATO was not designed primarily to keep peace among its members, it is a simple fact that peace and cooperation between Greece and Turkey will remain a high priority for NATO members.

108. There are some other outstanding bilateral differences among NATO members, for example, between the U.K. and Spain over Gibraltar, but it is the Greek-Turkish relationship that threatens to be NATO's Achilles heal in the Mediterranean region.


A vision for NATO

109. NATO in the 21st century should be an enduring political/military alliance among sovereign states whose purpose is to apply power and diplomacy to the collective defense and promotion of Allied security, democratic values, the rule of law, and peace.

The Allies still share enduring values and interests

110. The United States, Canada and European democracies have a strong and continuing mutual interest in sustaining and improving political, economic and military cooperation among them. Such cooperation not only helps maintain peaceful and prosperous relations inside the Euro-Atlantic area but also serves as a critical building block of stability for the international system as a whole.

111. The North Atlantic Treaty remains a vital document whose words express the basic values and interests shared by parties to the Treaty. The commitment of all Allies to collective defense demonstrates clearly their will to defend those values and interests, with force, if necessary. On this foundation, the Euro-Atlantic Allies can develop responses to the many new challenges to their interests. The Treaty provides a framework that should be expanded to include other European democracies who share the values expressed in the Treaty and are ready to contribute to fulfillment of the Treaty's goals.

112. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was originally shaped in the crucible of the Cold War, has throughout its history been adapted to changing international conditions. NATO remains the instrument the Allies should use to mount a collective defense should that be necessary again in the future. The North Atlantic Treaty also provides that the Allies may use NATO's framework of cooperation to defend and promote their security interests in cases that do not call into question the Article 5 commitment to defend Alliance borders against direct attack.

New challenges require continued cooperation

113. Challenges to the interests of the NATO members are not of the same character as those posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but they are numerous and, in many ways, more complex. These challenges will not always require military responses. But the availability of military options can frequently increase the chances for successful diplomatic resolution of issues. Moreover, maintaining core collective defense capabilities serves as a critical hedge against future challenges to the security of Allied nations. NATO consultations and cooperation on a day-to-day basis can make such options available. In the future, as in the past, NATO coalition responses will be far more politically convincing and militarily capable than actions by any one Ally.

The United States must sustain its leading role in and commitment to the Alliance

114. U.S. commitment to and leading role in the Alliance remain critical to NATO's future viability. In the 21st century, European stability and peace can best be maintained by active U.S. participation in the European security system. At the same time, the active participation of NATO Allies in responses to emerging security challenges in and beyond Europe will be essential to vital U.S. interests.

Reaffirm the necessity of the Alliance

115. The Allies must look at the April 1999 Summit as an opportunity not only to admit three new members but also to reaffirm the centrality of the North Atlantic Treaty to their values and interests, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as an instrument for collective defense and collective responsibility to help them deal with the new challenges they face. In revising NATO's Strategic Concept, the Allies should make it absolutely clear that the Euro-Atlantic community needs the Alliance to help shape the political will and the military capabilities required for the collective defense of common values and interests as well as the defense of territory.

116. NATO is not an end in itself. It exists as an expression of shared values and interests among its members and as a vehicle to facilitate their cooperation. The goal of the NATO members should be to create a system of cooperative security in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the transatlantic Alliance at its center, involving all European nations. The Euro-Atlantic community can be a cornerstone for the construction of peace, justice and stability in the wider international system.

NATO nations must sustain positive synergy of political, economic and military cooperation

117. In keeping with the admonitions of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Allies must ensure that trade and economic disagreements do not disrupt their fundamental interest in maintaining cooperative relationships. They also must work to prevent different tactical responses to international political and strategic problems from blocking the ability to find effective responses to those problems. In very few cases will the interests of the collective be served by uncompromising go-it-alone approaches by the United States or any other Ally. When fundamental disagreements block cooperation, consultations should be used to contain the potential damage of the inability to act in concert.

Strengthen the relationship between NATO and the North Atlantic Assembly

118. NATO's effectiveness and political vitality ultimately depend on support from parliaments and publics in the member states. Alliance governments and North Atlantic Assembly delegations must make special efforts to explain to their public opinion and to fellow parliamentarians why it is important that their nations continue to work within NATO in pursuit of common interests. A strong Euro-Atlantic relationship requires an effective and relevant NATO, and NATO's success in the future, as in the past, will require public and parliamentary support for its goals and programs.

119. In view of the centrality of the democratic process to future security and stability and the contribution made by the NAA to strengthening the process, the relationship of the NAA to NATO should be enhanced through intensified consultations and cooperation. The work of the Assembly is not merely supportive, but rather is an integral part of the overall Alliance effort and should be recognized as such. A closer relationship between NATO and the NAA will enhance NATO's political relevance and credibility.

120. Collective defense against an attack on any Alliance member, as provided in Article 5 of the Treaty, must remain NATO's core mission. In addition, NATO nations must focus increased political attention and defense resources on emerging outer core, non-Article 5, missions, including promoting stability in Europe, dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, responding to the terrorist challenge and providing options to deal with threats to security that can arise beyond NATO borders. In the 21st century, non-Article 5 outer core missions should be developed with the goal of diminishing the chance that NATO's inner core mission of collective defense will need to be invoked.

121. NATO nations must build their responses to new challenges around the solid core provided by collective defense capabilities. Such capabilities both hedge against an uncertain, future and provide a solid foundation for NATO's new missions. The Allies must ensure that there is a seamless continuum between all political and military aspects of NATO's inner core and outer core missions and capabilities. In this regard, NATO military authorities should seek to develop training, exercising, deployment and rotation concepts that enable regular forces to maintain combat capabilities while being employed in non-Article 5 , operations.

NATO's missions neither global nor artificially limited

122. The NATO Allies should neither suggest that NATO missions will assume a "global" character nor put artificial geographic limits on such missions. Allied decisions should be based on the specific circumstances of challenges to their security interests and the benefits and/or disadvantages associated with the options available to deal with such challenges.

NATO must preserve its freedom to act

123. The Allies must always seek to act in unison, preferably with a mandate from the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the framework for collective security in Europe. Even though all NATO member states undoubtedly would prefer to act with such a mandate, they must not limit themselves to acting only when such a mandate can be agreed. All NATO actions should nonetheless be based on appropriate legal authority.

Allies must share, not divide, burdens and responsibilities

124. It is critically important for the Allies to proclaim the importance of sharing responsibility for responses to security challenges while working out acceptable allocations of tasks both between North America and Europe and within Europe itself. Although tasks can be divided among Allies, responsibility must always be shared. NATO operations in Bosnia have illustrated the wisdom of such a sharing approach, while the early stages of the crisis clearly demonstrated the costs of trying to "divide" responsibility for challenges to the interests of the NATO members.

NATO should address terrorist challenges

125. Even when individual international terrorist acts affect only one Ally, it should be clear that each such act is part of a broader terrorist phenomenon that threatens the entire Alliance. Effective burdensharing in the future will require that all Allies contribute in a demonstrable fashion to the goal of combatting terrorism. NATO should be used more actively as a forum for sharing of intelligence, consultations on counter-terrorist approaches and strategies, and joint actions against terrorist threats.

NATO must continue to reach out

126. The NATO Allies must continue to pursue the goal of extending the area of democracy and stability in Europe by opening Alliance structures to cooperation with all European states and membership to those who wish to join and meet the requirements for membership. Furthermore, the Allies should actively continue reaching out to countries in the Mediterranean region, seeking to develop mutual understanding and cooperation with willing partners in this strategically critical region bordering the Alliance.

Pace, don't pause, the enlargement process

127. NATO enlargement should be carefully paced, not paused. The Washington Summit should initiate the next phase of enlargement. Having taken the first step down the enlargement path, the Allies must demonstrate that enlargement will be a continuing process. The opening of NATO to include eager and viable candidates reinforces NATO's strengths and leads toward a European security system that is inclusive and stabilizing.

128. Slovenia is well qualified today to be invited to join the Alliance, and is ready to make a net contribution to NATO's security and stability. Judged against the guidelines in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, Slovenia is as qualified for NATO membership as are the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Romania and Bulgaria are worthy candidates for the enlargement process, and their continued progress along the path of political, economic and military reform should in the next few years yield an invitation to join NATO. If Slovakia were to demonstrate a strong commitment to democracy in the coming years, it too should join the list of applicants deserving serious consideration. Some have argued for pausing the enlargement process after the first group of candidates, but the political costs of doing so would be substantial, feeding suspicion that a "temporary" pause will become permanent.

129. At the Washington Summit, Slovenia should be invited to begin negotiations aimed at accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. In addition to reflecting Slovenia's preparedness for membership, the invitation would demonstrate that the enlargement door remains open without overloading the enlargement process. In addition, all other candidates must be assured that their progress toward an invitation will be reviewed on a continuing basis and that their progress and shortcomings will be discussed with them annually.

130. The Allies must also avoid making enlargement decisions a competition between northern and southern candidates. The Baltic states deserve the opportunity to join NATO and the Allies should continue to integrate them into the work of the Alliance. Candidates for membership should be judged with reference to the guidelines provided in the Study on NATO Enlargement, regardless of their geographic location in Europe. As agreed by NATO leaders in Madrid in July 1997, no European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the Treaty should be excluded from consideration. Of course, the Allies should carefully monitor the continuing process of enlargement and its effects on the overall security and effectiveness of the Alliance.

A vital Partnership program must be a high priority

131. The Allies must continue to develop the Partnership for Peace in ways that encourage partners to participate to the maximum extent possible in NATO programs. In this regard, partnership cells should be established at sub-regional levels in the NATO command structure as well as at higher levels in the structure to expand opportunities for the Baltic states and other aspirants to join more fully in NATO's work. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council should be developed as a forum to channel information and views of partners into NATO's planning and decisionmaking process for non-Article 5 operations and development of CJTF capabilities.

Move relations with Russia beyond arms control through defense cooperation

132. The Allies have opened many doors to cooperation with Russia. The Permanent Joint Council and the Partnership for Peace program offer Russia virtually unlimited opportunities to develop serious consultative and cooperative relationships with NATO. The Allies must continue to make it clear that they seek a transparent and cooperative relationship with Russia. The approach should acknowledge Russia's importance to security in Europe while seeking to move Russia's attitude toward NATO beyond Cold War assumptions and perceptions toward a qualitatively new relationship.

133. Arms control remains a critical tool for management of relations among states in Europe and in the international system more generally. In particular, adaptation and implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) to the new European circumstances will be a source of reassurance and stability for many years to come. The Allies must nonetheless ensure that the revised Treaty does not restrict NATO's flexibility to reinforce old and new member states in crisis situations and to conduct peace support operations. At the same time, the CFE Treaty should draw Russia even closer into the common European security structures, thus complementing the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

134. The goal of the Allies, however, should be to use defense cooperation with Russia to move beyond arms control to a qualitatively new level of political and military relationships. However important arms control treaties may be, the Allies should persist with their attempts to create a European security system in which concepts like balance of power, zones of influence and strategic position are replaced by cooperative, integrative relationships. Long-term political stability must be based on the growth of democracy, economic development, mutual trust, and a system of cooperative security among all states in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Strengthen the OSCE's collective security role

135. The NATO Allies should declare that they value the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as the collective security framework in the emerging European security system. The Allies should support strengthening the OSCE's ability to facilitate resolution of security-related disputes involving one or more non-NATO member European states.

European Security and Defense Identity needs strong backbone of military capabilities

136. Although the Allies must not violate the principle of sharing responsibilities for all Alliance missions, the European members should take progressively more responsibility for security in Europe. Such an evolution in burdens and responsibilities should be managed in the overall framework of the transatlantic Alliance. For example, the Allies could shoulder more burdens and provide more leadership in the southern/Mediterranean region in the future as their capabilities warrant. The Allies should agree that European command responsibilities in NATO's southern region will be increased if and when European nations provide increased capabilities sufficient to protect and defend Allied interests there. For the time being, an American officer should retain command of NATO's Southern command.

137. Based on the continuing progress toward a viable European Security and Defense Identity within the framework of the Alliance, and the development of NATO as a key contributor to a cooperative European security system, France should return to full participation in NATO's command structure. If France should decide to resume full participation in NATO's Integrated Command Structure, the Allies should be willing to divide the Southern command into South-Western and South-Eastern commands. The South-Western command should be led by a European commander and deputy (most logically French and Spanish officers) while a U.S. officer with a European deputy should lead the South-Eastern command.

138. European Allies should concentrate on developing the forces and capabilities to implement the current goals of European defense cooperation before elaborating additional organizational schemes or structural initiatives. This will undoubtedly require more effective rationalization and consolidation of defense efforts within and among European states than the Allies have managed to date. The European Allies should seriously search for ways in which specialization in logistics support could make more effective use of available defense resources. The United States should give every possible help and encouragement to the continuing consolidation of European defense efforts. But the United States must not be held accountable for the inability of European states to develop a more coherent European role in the Alliance. It is the responsibility of the European Allies to develop the European Security and Defense Capabilities to give real meaning to a European Security and Defense Identity.

Allies must give higher priority to NATO defense planning process

139. The focus of the defense planning process is being expanded to include more concentration on forces, equipment, training and exercising required to deal with the imminent challenges of non-Article 5 missions, such as that in Bosnia. Planning related to implementation of the Combined Joint Task Force concept must be given a high priority. All NATO nations must increase their emphasis on force projection capabilities. Both collective defense and non-Article 5 challenges in the future will likely require forces capable of operating beyond national borders. The recent British White Paper on defense, modernization plans for French non-nuclear forces, and Germany's force restructuring plans all offer examples of the directions in which the Allies should move. In addition, all Allied nations must become more willing to identify forces that could be made available for non-Article 5 missions.

Make NATO defense planning and force goals transparent

140. NATO should annually prepare, publish and deliver to the President of the North Atlantic Assembly an unclassified report that would assess progress made toward developing capabilities required by NATO's new mission profile and identify the gaps that remain, with recommendations concerning how such shortcomings can be remedied. Members of the Alliance must demonstrate that they take their individual and collective international security responsibilities seriously, and that they are restructuring their forces in a fashion consistent with the guidelines laid down in the Strategic Concept and the military requirements that flow from it. The Alliance, and particularly its political leaders and legislators, need to know where we are failing to meet the needs of our military commanders - where there are shortfalls that limit NATO's ability to fulfill its missions.

Build a floor under Allied defense spending

141. Reduced defense spending in most member states is weakening NATO's ability to respond to new security challenges at a time when the operational tempo for Allied forces is increasing. The Allies should at the Washington Summit call for a voluntary moratorium on further defense budget reductions. The voluntary moratorium should continue until the Allies have decided what capabilities and expenditures are required to implement NATO's revised Strategic Concept. Even in the absence of active major threats, the Allies must remember that prudent defense efforts can deter future threats as well as help deal with current challenges to international peace and stability.

Keep a robust U.S. force presence in Europe

142. The number of U.S. troops deployed in Europe should be determined by the missions required by U.S. national interests, including the need to ensure that U.S. and Allied militaries can effectively plan, exercise for and participate effectively in NATO's agreed roles and missions. If the United States is to play a leading role in establishing and employing Combined Joint Task Forces to deal with future threats, it will be necessary to maintain sufficient forces in Europe to make this concept viable. Based on political guidance to be provided by NATO leaders in a revised Strategic Concept, U.S. and NATO military authorities should advise what levels and types of U.S. forces are required to implement the missions specified in a revised Strategic Concept.

Adopt an ambitious transatlantic coalition technology initiative

143. Recognizing the potential for deployed technologies to both promote and undercut the ability of the Allies to operate as coalition forces, NATO leaders in April 1999 should undertake two initiatives. First, the Allies should agree at the Washington Summit to develop a NATO Technology and Industrial Base Strategy. Its objective should be to preserve vital, competitive and complementary defense industrial bases on both sides of the Atlantic, to seek progressive elimination of barriers to defense trade on a NATO-wide basis, to encourage harmonization of competition policies, and to remove barriers that inhibit sharing of technology among Allied states.

144. Second, the Alliance should launch a Coalition Technology Initiative that would establish a specific requirement as part of NATO's annual defense planning process to identify technologies under development that could critically affect, either positively or negatively, the ability of Allied forces to work and fight together in future contingencies. The Military Committee should be tasked with making specific recommendations concerning which technologies could advance the cause of effective coalition operations and which developments might impede those capabilities.

145. The United States, as the military and technological leader of the Alliance, should devote a high priority in its national planning to the continued ability of its military forces to work in coalition with those of NATO nations. The European Allies, for their part, should harmonize their efforts in defense research and development. Given the limited resources that will be available for defense, this research and development funding must be applied as efficiently as possible, with a minimum of duplication. The United States and European Allies should try to identify areas where research, development and procurement can be organized on a transatlantic basis. They should look particularly for commercially-developed technologies whose coordinated integration into NATO forces can promote the cause of interoperability.

Nuclear weapons should remain a component of NATO strategy

146. Under current international conditions, NATO must keep a nuclear weapons component in its strategy, even though today there is no active threat that requires the Allies to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. The continued presence of such weapons, which are not aimed at any particular state or government, nonetheless creat, es a deterrent effect that contributes to overall peace and stability in Europe.

147. Under these circumstances, the Allies should continue to promote the progressive international reduction of nuclear weapons to the lowest possible levels. More importantly, they should encourage international cooperation in minimizing provocative or destabilizing deployments of nuclear weapons and should work through cooperation with Russia and China to move nuclear weapons systems to lower levels of readiness to reduce the chances of accidental launches. The United States should maintain its token nuclear presence in Europe for as long as such a presence is seen as reinforcing Allied security and as having a stabilizing effect on European security.

Take missile defense seriously

148. The Alliance should give urgent attention to missile defense, in particular to protect their forces when they are engaged in military operations. The proliferation of missile technologies and systems, especially those that can deliver weapons of mass destruction, is an increasingly worrisome security threat. It is not unthinkable that in the foreseeable future rogue states or terrorist groups will acquire missile capabilities with the intent of threatening an Ally or the Alliance. In a time of limited resources, NATO nations need to work together to develop missile defense systems that could preserve the ability of Allied forces to fulfill assigned missions.

Face the facts in the Balkans

149. The success with which NATO's IFOR and SFOR deployments have provided the security necessary to build a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrates how important NATO cooperation can be to the goal of protecting and promoting Allied interests in the Euro-Atlantic area. However, as long as there is a tinderbox in the Balkans there can be no stable peace in Europe. If NATO is to continue to play a constructive role in the effort to bring enduring peace to the Balkans, two important lessons from the Balkan tragedy must be heeded.

150. First, the early hesitation of the Allies to act in response to the crisis on Bosnia undoubtedly cost many lives in former Yugoslavia and probably has cost the Allies much more financially and militarily than would have earlier political/military intervention. Second, the recent experience in Kosovo suggests that NATO should only threaten military intervention when the Allies are willing and clearly prepared to fulfill those threats. Empty threats only undermine the effectiveness of NATO's current policies in the Balkans and, more broadly, the long-term credibility of the Alliance.

151. With regard to the organization of NATO's role in Bosnia, the continued U.S. presence obviously remains important. However, in future, the European role in the Bosnia operation should receive increased emphasis, including designation of a European officer as the overall commander of operations in Bosnia, within the NATO chain of command.